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INTRODUCTION
What do Conferences of the Parties to multilateral environmental
agreements contribute to international legal obligation? What does the
answer mean for adaptability, fragmentation, and accountability in the
international legal system?
This Article adds to a nascent and still limited awareness that some-
thing important is afoot in international law: the activity of Conferences
of the Parties (COPs) to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).'
Some of this activity-such as formal amendments to a treaty or proto-
col-requires a state party's consent before it will be binding on that
state. This activity fits easily within traditional categories of the sources
of international law and gives rise to new obligations for states that are
identifiable as hard law. However, other activity by COPs does not re-
quire the consent of every state party to the treaty in order to come into
effect and does not provide for any form of opt-out for dissenting states;
it is agreed on by consensus or, failing consensus, some form of majority
vote. I term this consensus-based COP activity.
Through this consensus-based activity, COPs frequently pass agree-
ments that alter the application and scope of their treaties. Conventional
categories for the sources of international law are inadequate to capture
the significance of this consensus-based COP activity. As the Article dis-
cusses, this activity does not fit within the traditional sources of hard
law-that is, treaty and custom. Yet relying by default on the usual clas-
1. See Jutta Brunnbe, Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent
in Environmental Framework Agreements, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
TREATY MAKING 101 (RUdiger Wolfrum & Volker Roben eds., 2005) [hereinafter Brunnbe,
Reweaving the Fabric]; Jutta Brunn6e, COPing with Consent: Lawmaking Under Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Brunnde, COPing
with Consent]; Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 623 (2000).
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sification of this activity as soft law is also inadequate, because it ob-
scures the complex relationship between consensus-based COP activity
and the underlying treaty obligations of the parties to that treaty.
Focusing on whether consensus-based COP activity is really law is
misplaced. Instead, we should be asking what the relationship is between
consensus-based COP activity and the original international legal obliga-
tions of the parties to the underlying treaty. Reframing the question in
this way gives us a new and more accurate picture of the role of COP
activity. The picture we get is of a series of resolutions and decisions
that, although they do not generally stand apart from the parties' primary
treaty obligations, enrich those original legal obligations by thickening
them.
Viewing COP activity in this light also gives us a more complex pic-
ture of the international legal system. We begin to see a system that
allows for adaptability, flexibility, and learning in response to new scien-
tific and social information. At the same time, recognizing some legal
status for COP activity highlights the potential for increasing sectoral
fragmentation in the international legal system. However, reframing the
question about the role of consensus-based COP activity also offers op-
portunities to better manage this sectoral fragmentation. Recognizing the
legal significance of consensus-based COP activity therefore has
implications for international law generally, beyond multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements and international environmental law.
The Article begins in Part I by exploring the kinds of activity that re-
sult from consensus-based decisionmaking at COPs, using representative
examples from a few key multilateral environmental agreements. Part II
then considers, first, how this activity fits into conventional approaches
to the sources of law and, second, the relevance of soft law and hard law
distinctions to consensus-based COP activity. Neither approach is satis-
factory because each is designed to assess provisions that can hold
independent normative force. Yet the significance of consensus-based
COP activity lies not in the possibility that it can create new stand-alone
legal rules, but in its tightly bound relationship to the underlying treaty
obligations of the parties. Part II therefore concludes by suggesting that
we reframe the question from one about whether this activity is law to
one about this activity's relationship to the parties' underlying treaty ob-
ligations. Part III discusses the implications of this reframing, focusing
on two different tribunal decisions-one from the United States and one
from the Netherlands-that addressed the legal status of consensus-
based COP decisions.
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Finally, Part IV addresses what recognizing the significance of this
consensus-based COP activity adds to discussions about fragmentation
and accountability in the international legal system.
Whether COP activity is hard or soft law is not the most important
question. Rather, it is more important to focus on understanding the role
consensus-based COP activity plays in the international legal system and
the implications of that role for states' international legal obligations.
The Article argues that consensus-based COP activity contributes to in-
ternational legal obligation by thickening the obligations of the parties to
the underlying treaty. Although not all consensus-based COP activity has
this effect, this activity can thicken these obligations in a few ways. It
can deepen the parties' obligations by contributing to implementation
and effectiveness.2 It can add to the fullness of the obligations by adding
to the text of the original treaty through interpretation and guidance. In
doing so, it contributes to our understanding of fragmentation in the in-
ternational legal system and of ways to manage that fragmentation.
I. CONSENSUS-BASED COP ACTIVITY
A. Defining Consensus-Based COP Activity
Multilateral environmental agreements are a dominant force in inter-
national environmental law.3 These MEAs result in longstanding mutual
commitments and cooperation, create institutions that coordinate sci-
ence, explore new frontiers of environmental policy, and address the
intersection of environmental issues with development, human rights,
and trade. As treaties, they represent one of the most accepted sources of
international legal obligation.4 A state that has consented to be bound by
an MEA that is in force is, under international law, bound to comply
with it.5
2. I use the term deepen in a slightly different way than the notion of "depth of coop-
eration" discussed by Downs et al., although there is some overlap. See George W. Downs et
al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379
(1996).
3. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues
and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 679-81 (1993).
4. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
5. This principle-known as pacta sunt servanda-is elaborated in Article 26 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states that "[e]very treaty in force is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." VCLT art. 26,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 179-80 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is regarded
as "the fundamental principle of the law of treaties").
[Vol. 31:231
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However, the picture of a binding MEA as an expression of the con-
sent of its states parties is more complicated than might appear at first
sight. Over the past few decades, these MEAs have developed a mode of
operation that calls into question some of our understandings and as-
sumptions about international legal obligation, particularly as it pertains
to treaty regimes.6
To operate on an ongoing basis, these MEAs generally establish an
institution known as a Conference of the Parties, a COP, 7 made up of
representatives of all of the states parties to the MEA, who meet regu-
larly-every year, every other year, or every few years. These COPs are
the supreme body of the treaty.8 Some COPs allow non-party states, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and other non-parties to observe
and sometimes participate in discussions and negotiations. However, the
voting members of the COP are representatives of the states parties and
have one vote per state.' °
COPs engage in a number of activities, which can be broken down
into two subsets for the purposes of this Article. First, COPs undertake
activities that require the formal consent of a state before that state can
be bound by them." Even if formal consent is not required, these activi-
ties allow for some kind of opt-out, ensuring that a state that does not
6. Brunnde, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1, at 106 (explaining that "[i]t is in this
continuous process of treaty development that Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and their
subsidiary bodies have come to be the main venues for lawmaking activities and, therefore,
the focus of growing interest in shifting patterns in international environmental lawmaking").
7. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 623-25 (listing agreements that create
COPs or COP equivalents).
8. Id. at 631; see also, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change art. 13(1), Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (entered into force Feb.
15, 2005) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; United Nations Framework Convention on Environ-
ment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 7(2), May 9, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES], The Structure of
CITES, http://www.cites.orglengldisc/org.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (indicating that
the CITES COP is the supreme institutional body of the treaty).
9. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 13(2), 13(8); UNFCCC, supra note 8,
art. 7(6); CITES art. XI(7), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 12 I.L.M. 1085; Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat art. 7(1), Feb. 2, 1971,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,084, 996 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention].
10. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 13(2); CITES, supra note 9, art. XI(7);
Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2).
11. See, e.g., CITES, supra note 9, art. XVII(3) (providing that an amendment to the
treaty will enter into force only for parties that have accepted it in accordance with the terms
of the treaty); UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 15(4) (providing that an amendment to the treaty
will enter into force only for parties that have accepted it in accordance with the procedures in
Article 15).
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wish to be bound will not be.'2 Examples of COP activity requiring for-
mal consent include formal amendments to the treaty text, amendments
to appendices or annexes, and the conclusion of protocols-new trea-
ties-under a framework convention.'3
The second category of activities is the focus of this Article. This ac-
tivity requires only consensus by the states parties-not formal
consent-to be binding, and does not provide for any kind of opt-out by
an objecting state. Where consensus cannot be achieved, the product of
this activity might come into force on the basis of a majority or super-
majority vote, which would then bind all states parties, whether or not
they voted in favor of the resolution or decision. 4 Sometimes, consensus
may be equivalent to unanimity, suggesting that where resolutions or
decisions are adopted by consensus, they have been adopted by the con-
sent of all the parties and are not, therefore, different from the consent-
based COP activity described above. 5 However, consensus differs from
consent because a state does not have to consent formally to be bound by
a decision reached by consensus. Further, where consensus and/or una-
nimity cannot be achieved, this activity may enter into force for all
parties after a majority or super-majority vote. As such, a state does not
have to consent formally to a provision to be bound by it. Indeed, under
a consensus-based procedure backed up by a majority or super-majority
voting procedure, a state could actively object to a provision and still be
bound if that provision were to be considered binding.
12. See, e.g., CITES, supra note 9, arts. XV(l)(c), XV(2)(l), XV(3) (allowing for par-
ties to enter reservations to amendments of Appendices I and II of the Convention so that they
will not be bound by those amendments); UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 16(3) (providing that
annexes to the treaty will enter into force at a certain time for all parties except those that have
indicated their non-acceptance of the annex).
13. See UNFCCC supra note 8; see also, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 13(2)
(providing that only parties to the Kyoto Protocol may participate in decisionmaking under the
Protocol).
14. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 13(5) (providing that the rules of proce-
dure for the COP for the Kyoto Protocol will be the same as under the UNFCCC except as
otherwise decided by consensus by the parties to the Kyoto Protocol); UNFCCC, supra note
8, art. 7(3) (authorizing the COP to adopt rules of procedure that will include specified majori-
ties for the adoption of particular decisions); Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(2)
(providing for COP resolutions and decisions to be adopted by simple majority, unless other-
wise specified by the treaty). Use of the terms "resolutions" and "decisions" depends on the
terminology used by a particular treaty, although in some treaties, the terms signify different
kinds of activities. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
15. See Royal C. Gardner, Perspectives on Wetlands and Biodiversity: International
Law, Iraqi Marshlands, and Incentives for Restoration, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y,
2003 Yearbook, Summer 2004, at 1, 2-9 [hereinafter Gardner, Perspectives on Wetlands] (dis-
cussing controversy about the meaning of "consensus" at the Eighth Conference of the Parties
to the Ramsar Convention).
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This activity-which I term consensus-based COP activity-is a
significant force in international environmental law. The following Part
explores the full range of this activity.
B. Exploring the Range of Consensus-Based COP Activity
Using a consensus-based decision-making process, COPs perform a
range of activities that result in resolutions and decisions without which
the treaty cannot be adequately understood. COPs interpret treaty obliga-
tions and develop rules, modalities, and procedures for implementation
of particular provisions of the treaty. They also provide guidance to the
parties about implementation, consider compliance and dispute resolu-
tion matters, establish subsidiary organs, address financial and
organizational aspects of the treaty and its subsidiary organs, and set
strategic frameworks for the future of the treaty.
Some of this COP activity addresses the external obligations of the
parties, in that it directly affects the obligations the parties have under-
taken as they implement the treaty.' 6 Other resolutions and decisions
address only the internal operation of the treaty, in that they only address
the parties' activity at the COP or the activity of subsidiary bodies to the
COP.'7 Yet even these can have an effect on the substantive obligations of
the parties. To better illustrate the relationship of consensus-based COP
activity to the parties' underlying treaty obligations, the following Parts
distinguish between activity that affects the external obligations of the
parties and activity that affects the internal obligations of the parties.'8
1. Effects on External Obligations
Activity that addresses the external obligations of the parties may af-
fect the substantive obligations with which the parties have undertaken
16. These might also be termed effects on the "substantive" obligations of the parties.
Geir Ulfstein, Comment on Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent
in Environmental Framework Agreements, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
TREATY MAKING, supra note 1, at 145, 146 [hereinafter Ulfstein, Comment].
17. See id. at 149 (distinguishing between substantive law-making by international
organizations-including COPs-and internal law-making and arguing that only the former
needs express authorization in the treaty text); Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 631-43
(discussing as two separate categories of activity the internal powers of multilateral environ-
mental agreements (MEAs) and their decision-making powers relating to the parties'
substantive obligations).
18. The distinction between external and internal effects may appear at first sight to be
a distinction between substance and procedure. However, the fault lines are different since an
external effect might include a procedure with which a state party is bound to comply, and an
internal effect might include a substantive provision with which a subsidiary body is bound to
comply.
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to comply under the treaty. This activity may affect these substantive
obligations either directly or indirectly.
Although direct changes to the parties' external obligations are often
made through consent-based COP activity,' 9 sometimes changes are
made through consensus-based COP activity.
Under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Montreal Protocol), 20 for example, the COP is authorized to adopt
adjustments and reductions of production or consumption of ozone-
depleting substances covered by the Protocol through a consensus-based
procedure.2 ' Failing consensus, these adjustments can be made by a two-
thirds majority vote of the parties present and voting at the COP.2 The
adjustments are binding on all parties, regardless of whether or not they
voted in favor of themY.
Under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Impor-
tance (Ramsar Convention), it is the parties' responsibility to designate
wetlands for listing on the Convention's List of Wetlands of International
Importance.2 The treaty text itself contains only a sparse set of criteria to
guide this listing.5 Even so, the Ramsar COPs have modified these crite-
ria several times, moving them away from their original focus on
waterfowl-the primary impetus for many states' support of the treaty.
26
The criteria for listing wetlands now include references to a wetlands'
relationship to major river basins or coastal systems. They also supple-
ment earlier criteria that support listing on the basis of numbers of
waterbirds with additional criteria based on numbers of fish and other
species of wetland dependent, non-avian animals.27 Thus, the criteria the
19. See, e.g., CITES, supra note 9, art. XV (setting out the procedures for amendments
to Appendices I and II of the treaty and allowing for reservations to those amendments).
20. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. For the amended text, see http://www.unep.org/
ozone/pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
21. See id. art. 2(9)(a). Article 2(9) was added through amendments to the Protocol in
1990. Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16, at 147.
22. Montreal Protocol, supra note 20, art. 2(9)(c).
23. Id. art. 2(9)(d).
24. Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(1).
25. See id. art. 2(2).
26. See International Conference on the Conservation of Wetlands and Waterfowl, Heili-
genhafen, F.R.G., Dec. 2-6, 1974, Recommendations of the Heiligenhafen Conference, 1974,
available at http:/lwww.ramsar.orglcdalramsar/display/mainlmain.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-31-
107A23021_4000_0__ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (establishing in 1974 the first criteria for
designation of wetlands of international importance).
27. See Strategic Framework and Guidelines for the Future Development of the List of
Wetlands of International Importance, Res. VII. I I (COP 7, 1999), as amended by Res. VII.13
(COP 7, 1999), Res. VIII.I 1 (COP 8, 2002), Res. VIII.33 (COP 8, 2002), Res. IX.I Annexes
A, B (COP 9, 2005), Res. X.20 (COP 10, 2008), available at http://www.ramsar.org/cda/
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parties are meant to apply to listing decisions have been extensively ela-
borated upon and have changed over the years.28
Sometimes a resolution or decision speaks directly to the external
obligations of the parties in a way that goes beyond the parameters of the
original treaty's obligations. At the Second Conference of the Parties to
the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention),29 the parties
adopted Decision 1/12, which would have banned the transport of haz-
ardous wastes from OECD countries to non-OECD countries." This ban
was not contemplated by the treaty text, which approaches regulation of
international trade in waste through information and consent rather than
through prohibitions and bans.3
Consensus-based COP activity can also have indirect effects on the
external obligations of the parties. These can occur in a number of ways,
two of the most significant of which are through the COPs' role in inter-
preting treaty terms and in providing guidance to parties about
implementation.
ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=1-31-10520823_4000_0 (last visited Nov. 11,
2009).
28. M.J. Bowman, The Ramsar Convention Comes of Age, XLII NETH. L. REV. 1, § 7
(1995) (arguing that the elaboration of the criteria for listing has been a key aspect of the Con-
vention's development from a convention focused on individual species of waterfowl to one
concerned about ecosystems in general). The COPs have also developed guidance on listing.
See, e.g., Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention, Valencia,
Spain, Nov. 18-26, 2002, Additional Guidance for Identifying and Designating Under-
Represented Wetland Types as Wetlands of International Importance, Res. VIII. 11, available
at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key-res-viii- 11 e.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
29. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
30. Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Conven-
tion on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,
Geneva, Switz., Mar. 21-25, 1994, Decision 11/12, UNEP/CHW.2/30 (Mar. 25, 1994), avail-
able at http://www.basel.intlmeetings/cop/copl-4/cop2repe.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009)
[hereinafter Decision 11/12, Basel Convention].
31. Jacob Werksman, The Conference of Parties to Environmental Treaties, in GREEN-
ING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 55, 63-64 (Jacob Werksman ed., 1996) (discussing
Decision 11/12 as an example of a COP making changes to the substantive obligations of a
treaty); see also GUnther Handl, Comment: International "Lawmaking" by Conferences of the
Parties and Other Politically Mandated Bodies, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN TREATY MAKING, supra note 1, at 127, 130-36 (describing other examples of activity by
COPs that have led to disputes among the parties to the treaty about that activity's legal sta-
tus).
32. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 641 (discussing the role COPs play in the
interpretation of agreements).
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Although the Ramsar Convention's overall approach is primarily to
rely on exhortations rather than strong substantive requirements,3  its
COPs have still spent significant time defining those treaty terms that
inform the external, substantive obligations of the parties. They have
done this using resolutions adopted by a simple majority of the parties.
Under the treaty, the parties are to formulate and implement their na-
tional wetlands planning "so as to promote the conservation of the
wetlands included in the List [of Wetlands of International Importance],
and as far as possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory. 34 The
parties must also "arrange to be informed ... if the ecological character
of any wetland" in their territory that is on the List "has changed, is
changing, or is likely to change. 35 With the assistance of their Scientific
and Technical Review Committee, the Ramsar Convention COPs have
extensively defined and re-defined the key terms contained in these pro-
visions-"ecological character" and "wise use. 36 In addition, the
Secretariat to the Convention, authorized by the COP, has prepared sev-
enteen handbooks providing guidance to domestic managers of wetlands
about how to implement the wise use of wetlands.37 These handbooks
include "relevant guidance adopted by several meetings of the Confer-
ence of the Parties, ... as well as selected background documents
presented at these COPs."38 Thus, through interpretation and guidance,
the Ramsar COPs have elevated the significance of "wise use" as a core
obligation of the treaty. This arguably shifts the emphasis away from
listed sites towards an emphasis on the overall obligation to maintain the
wise use of all wetlands within a state party's territory.3 9
33. See Royal C. Gardner & Kim Diana Connolly, The Ramsar Convention on Wet-
lands: Assessment of International Designations Within the United States, 37 ELR 10089,
10089-90 (2007) [hereinafter Gardner & Connolly, Ramsar Convention]; Annecoos
Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Re-Thinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental
and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1285 (2008) [hereinafter Wiersema, Train
Without Tracks].
34. Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(1).
35. Id. art. 3(2).
36. See, e.g., Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention,
Kampala, Uganda, Nov. 8-15, 2005, A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of Wetlands
and the Maintenance of Their Ecological Character, Res. IX.I, Annex A, available at
http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key-res-ix-annexa-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
37. Ramsar Convention Secretariat 2007, Ramsar Handbooks for the Wise Use of Wet-
lands [hereinafter Ramsar Handbooks], available at http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/
display/main/main.jspzn=ramsar&cp=l-30-33A21323_40000 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
38. Id.
39. See Wiersema, Train Without Tracks, supra note 33, at 1291.
[Vol. 31:231
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2. Effects on Internal Obligations
Other COP resolutions and decisions address only the internal opera-
tion of the treaty. Examples include the criteria used when parties vote at
the COP on formal amendments to the treaty and the instructions for
work to be done by a subsidiary body. Even this internal activity can
have significant effects on the way in which the treaty operates and, indi-
rectly therefore, on the substantive obligations of the parties.
4
0
For example, under the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES), listing of a species on one of two main
appendices is key to the operation of the treaty's intended protection of
internationally traded species.4 ' Amendment of these two appendices is
subject to a consent-based procedure.4 '2 However, the criteria used for
listing decisions by the parties are the product of consensus-based COP
resolutions.43 The most recent criteria include an elaborate set of both
biological and trade criteria for listing." These criteria took several
COPs to finalize, as parties fought over issues that represent key disputes
regarding the operation of the treaty as a whole-in particular the role of
sustainable utilization in species conservation, presumptions about list-
ing, and the role of the precautionary principle in listing decisions.45
40. Of course, some internally directed COP activity has very little if any effect on the
obligations of the parties. It is routine, for example, for the parties to thank the host state to the
COP and to determine the location of the next host state. However, in some instances, even the
choice of location for the next COP might affect how the parties act within the treaty. For
example, Japan withdrew its proposed reservation to the Appendix I listing of the African
elephant under CITES, despite its interest in continuing trade in ivory, apparently because of
concern that damage to Japan's reputation might prevent it from hosting the next Conference
of the Parties. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 268-69 (1995).
41. CITES, supra note 9, arts. I-IV. CITES also provides for a third appendix. See id.
arts. 111(3), V. Listing on Appendix III carries less significance than listing on Appendix I or II.
Id. art. V. Amendments to Appendix III do not require a vote of the parties, but do allow for
reservations by states parties. Id. art. XVI.
42. Amendments of Appendices I and II require a two thirds majority vote of the parties
present and voting, but also allow for reservations. See id. arts. XVI, XVII, XXIII.
43. The treaty sets out a standard for listing on either Appendix I or II. See id. art. 1H.
However, the criteria established by the COPs elaborate on these standards in far more detail.
44. Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, The Hague, Neth.,
June 3-15, 2007, Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and 11, Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoPI 4)
(amending Res. Conf. 9.24 (1994)), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/resall/09/EO9-
24R14.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) [hereinafter CITES Criteria]. Although the final
amendments were adopted at the Fourteenth Conference of the Parties, the major revisions to
the previous criteria began at the Twelfth Conference of the Parties. Id.
45. For a discussion of the role of the precautionary principle in these criteria and the
debates surrounding that role, see Annecoos Wiersema, Adversaries or Partners? 'Science and
the Precautionary Principle in International Treaties for the Protection of Wildlife Treaty
Regimes, 11 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 211 (2008).
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The listing criteria are addressed to the parties to be applied both in
proposals for listing and in their votes on listing. 6 Although they do not
directly alter the parties' external obligations under the treaty, the terms
of the criteria inevitably shape the way the parties consider how the trea-
ty should apply to particular species. This is especially true because the
criteria affect the central operating methodology of the treaty-
protection through listing on the appendices. As they debated the criteria,
the parties' comments often seemed to accept implicitly that the criteria
established by the COP related to the treaty's operation as a whole and
that the parties would be bound to apply them.47
The CITES COPs have also agreed to other resolutions that are in-
ternally directed but that contribute to the overall implementation and
effectiveness of the treaty, for example by establishing monitoring sys-
tems for certain species like elephants and a significant trade review
process.4 8 These monitoring systems are implemented and supervised by
subsidiary bodies to the COP.
49
The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change provides a similar exam-
ple.5" At its core, the Kyoto Protocol is an emissions trading scheme.
Parties with fixed emissions limits can fulfill their obligations by earning
emissions credits through the flexible mechanisms outlined under the
treaty, Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and an
overall emissions trading scheme.' In 2001, the COP to the Kyoto Pro-
tocol's framework convention-the United Nations Framework
46. See CITES Criteria, supra note 44; see also CITES, supra note 9, art. XV.
47. See, e.g., Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, CITES, Santiago, Chile,
Nov. 3-15, 2002, Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CoPI 2 Doc 58 Annex 5a, at
1, 4, 5, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/12/doc/E12-58-A5a.pdf (last visited Nov.
11, 2009) (recording the comments of Australia, Great Britain, Norway, and New Zealand in
response to proposed amendments to the criteria at the Twelfth Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties to CITES).
48. See Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, CITES, Harare, Zimb., June 9-
20, 1997, Conf. 10.10: Trade in Elephant Specimens, Rev. CoPI 4, amended at the Fourteenth
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, CITES, The Hague, Neth., Jun. 3-15, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/lO/EIO-10R14.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2009)
(establishing, among other things, a system for monitoring the illegal killing of elephants,
known as MIKE, and an elephant trade information system, known as ETIS); Twelfth Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 3-15, 2002, Conf 12.8: Re-
view of Significant Trade in Specimens of Appendix-l Species, Rev. CoP 13, amended at
Thirteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, Bangkok, ThaiL., Oct. 2-14,
2004, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/allU12/El2-08R13.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2009).
49. See Conf 10.10: Trade in Elephant Specimens, supra note 48; Conf. 12.8: Review
of Significant Trade in Specimens of Appendix-Il Species, supra note 48.
50. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8.
51. ld. arts. 6, 12, 17.
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Convention on Climate Change 52-adopted a set of decisions that ad-
dressed the implementation of these flexible mechanisms.s More
recently, the Kyoto Protocol's own COP-equivalent-the Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC Acting as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
ProtocolS'-has agreed to decisions that address the availability of emis-
sions credits for small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects.5
These decisions, in affecting domestic land use practices, could have a
significant effect on states parties' domestic activities.
By establishing modalities and procedures for implementing and
monitoring the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the meeting
of the parties is in one sense simply determining how its own subsidiary
organs will monitor the activities of the parties. The parties' substantive
obligations are thereby not directly affected. However, by determining
criteria for the issuance of credits, this COP activity does affect how the
parties can meet their overall substantive obligations under the treaty to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, this consensus-based COP
activity has both internal and external implications.
Similarly, COPs frequently develop reporting or compliance moni-
toring mechanisms through consensus-based resolutions or decisions-
CITES, the Ramsar Convention, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto
52. See UNFCCC, supra note 8.
53. These decisions are known as the Marrakesh Accords. See Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of
the Parties on Its Seventh Session: Addendum, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, (Jan. 21, 2002),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) [here-
inafter Marrakesh Accords]. Prior to the Protocol's entry into force, its Framework
Convention's COP provided the parties with some indication of the future direction of the
Protocol. Marrakesh Accords, supra, at 3; Brunnde, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1, at
114.
54. The Kyoto Protocol specifies that the COP to its framework convention, the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, shall serve as the meeting of the parties
to the Protocol. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 13.
55. See Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol, Poznan, Pol., Dec. 3-15, 2007, Decision 9/CMP3: Implications of Possible Changes
to the Limit for Small-Scale Afforestation and Reforestation Clean Development Mechanism
Project Activities, in Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Third Session: Addendum, at 26, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.I (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.intlresource/docs/
2007/cmp3/eng/09aOl.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); First Session of the Conference of the
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-
Dec. 10, 2005, Decision 5/CMP : Modalities and Procedures for Afforestation and Reforesta-
tion Project Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism in the First Commitment
Period of the Kyoto Protocol, at 61, U.N. Doc. FCCCIKP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 1 (Mar. 30, 2006),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docsl2005/cmpl/eng/08aOl.pdf (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
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Protocol's COPs have all done so in one form or another.16 These resolu-
tions or decisions take the form of procedural obligations that do not
affect the substance of the parties' commitments. They often operate
through rules binding on subsidiary organs within the treaty regime like
the Secretariat. Yet by creating measures to enhance compliance, they
add to the substantive implementation of the parties' obligations and
thereby have an external effect." Indeed, under the Ramsar Convention,
the COPs have facilitated and enhanced the core procedural approach of
the treaty by requiring reporting by the state prior to each COP and by
providing extensive guidelines and commentary on those reports. s Be-
cause procedural mechanisms and shaming lie at the heart of the Ramsar
Convention's means of protecting international wetlands, 9 the COP's
role in developing procedures for reporting and disseminating informa-
tion that can result in shaming recalcitrant states must be seen as
significant.
Finally, COPs contribute to development and implementation of the
treaty by establishing and directing subsidiary bodies. COP resolutions
and decisions direct these subsidiary bodies to develop interpretations or
propose technical specifications. 6° Some of this subsidiary activity will
56. See Jutta Brunnde, The Kyoto Protocol: Testing Ground for Compliance Theories?,
63 ZEITSCHRIFTr FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND Vi)LKERRECHT (HEIDELBERG
J. INT'L L.) 255, 275 (2003) (F.R.G.) (describing how the Kyoto compliance committee tries
to decide non-compliance cases by consensus); Gerhard Loibl, Reporting and Information
Systems in International Environmental Agreements as a Means for Dispute Prevention-The
Role of "International Institutions", 5 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT'L L. 1, 3-12 (2005) (de-
scribing the reporting requirements established by the COPs of a number of different
environmental agreements).
57. Brunnte, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1, at 11; Ulfstein, Comment, supra
note 16, at 148-50 (stating that COPs also frequently implement financing provisions, produc-
ing a similar dynamic between internal and external effects on the parties' implementation).
58. See Bowman, supra note 28, at 14 (noting that the first COP Parties to the Ramsar
Convention called upon all parties to submit reports to the Bureau at least six months prior to
the holding of each COP meeting); see also, e.g., Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the
Parties to the Ramsar Convention, Valencia, Spain, Nov. 18-26, 2002, Enhancing the Informa-
tion on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Sites), Res. VIII.13, available at
http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key-res-viii-13-e.pdf (last visited Nov.11, 2009); Sixth Meet-
ing of the Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention, Brisbane, Austl., Mar. 19-27,
1996, Submission of Information on Sites Designated for the Ramsar List of Wetlands of In-
ternational Importance, Res. VI.13, available at http://www.rarusar.org/pdf/res/key-res-
vi. 13e.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
59. Wiersema, Train Without Tracks, supra note 33, at 1285-87.
60. See, e.g., Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, Gigiri,
Kenya, Apr. 10-20, 2000, Conf 11.1: Establishment of Committees, Rev. COP 14, amended by
Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, The Hague, Neth., June 3-15,
2007, CITES Strategic Vision: 2008-2013, Res. 14.2, available at http://www.cites.org/
eng/res/1 1/1 1-01R14.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (establishing committees and specify-
ing their general terms of reference); Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to
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be subject to consent-based procedures before it can come into effect,
binding only those states that agree to be bound. However, the fact that
the COPs set the agenda for the subsidiary bodies gives the COPs a de-
gree of control over the direction of the treaty.1
3. Conclusion
Consensus-based COP activity results in resolutions and decisions
by the parties to the underlying treaty that can influence the substantive
obligations of the parties in numerous ways, affect the internal workings
of the treaty regime and its institutions, and serve efforts to enhance the
effectiveness of the treaty.
This exploration of COP activity highlights, however, that this activ-
ity does not result in resolutions or decisions that can be divorced from
the underlying treaty. These resolutions and decisions are tightly con-
nected with the original treaty and enrich it by thickening the parties'
obligations. Although not all consensus-based COP activity will have
this effect, it can thicken these obligations in a few ways. It can deepen
the obligations by contributing to implementation and effectiveness. It
can add to the fullness of the obligations by adding to the text of the
original treaty through interpretation and guidance.
As such, this consensus-based COP activity can be viewed as having
a close relationship to the treaty. However, it generally cannot be seen as
giving rise to stand-alone legal or even political obligations. COP resolu-
tions and decisions hold little meaning but for their connection to the
treaty.
However, this recognition of the effects of consensus-based COP ac-
tivity does not tell us how we should regard the activity's legal status or
its place in schemas of international legal obligation.
While COP activity has been noticed by commentators over the years,
very few have delved deeply into the question of how it should be viewed
in terms of international legal obligation.6 Two notable exceptions include
CITES, The Hague, Neth., June 3-15, 2007, Periodic Review of the Appendices, Conf. 14.8,
available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/14/14-08.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (instruct-
ing the Animals and Plants Committee to establish a schedule for the periodic review of the
appendices to CITES).
61. COPs also develop plans of action and strategic plans for the future of the treaty.
These can be directed at both states parties and to the COP or subsidiary bodies. See, e.g.,
Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, The Hague, Neth., June 3-15,
2007, CITES Strategic Vision: 2008-2013, Conf. 14.2, available at http://www.cites.org/
eng/res/14/14-02.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (addressing the parties, the Secretariat, and
the Standing Committee).
62. See, e.g., MALGOSIA FITZMAUR1CE & OLUFEMI ELIAS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
THE LAW OF TREATIES 254-69 (2005); Werksman, supra note 31; Nikolaos Lavranos,
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the seminal article by Churchill and Ulfstein in 2000 and the compelling
work of Jutta Brunn6e.63
Churchill and Ulfstein's piece addresses the full range of COP activ-
ity-consent-based and consensus-based-and argues that COPs should
be viewed as international organizations.6 Thus, the product of COPs
should be evaluated according to the rules applicable to international
organizations. However, even Churchill and Ulfstein do not reach defini-
tive conclusions about the legally binding status of some COP activity-
for example COP resolutions or decisions that interpret provisions of the
treaty---even when such activity has substantive implications for the
65parties.
Focusing on examples from the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol,
Jutta Brunn6e's work delves into the implications of COP activity on our
understanding of international law as the product of consent by states.6
She argues that the recognition that COPs are engaged in what she terms
"de facto law-making" forces us to question our traditional view of in-
ternational legal obligation.67
The following Part both builds on and departs from this work as the
Article begins to address the thorny question of the legal status of con-
sensus-based COP activity.
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Who Makes the Binding Decisions?, 11 EUR. ENVTL.
L. REV. 44 (Feb. 2002); Loibl, supra note 56; Peter H. Sand, Institution-Building to Assist
Compliance with International Environmental Law: Perspectives, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT (HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L.), 774
(1996) (F.R.G.).
63. See generally Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1; see also Brunne, Reweaving the
Fabric, supra note 1; Brunn6e, COPing with Consent, supra note 1.
64. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 631-43,655,658.
65. Id. at 641-42. Treating COPs as international organizations and therefore COP
resolutions and decisions as equivalent to the authorized activity of an international organiza-
tion does not mean that all commentators would automatically treat these resolutions and
decisions as hard international law. See, e.g., Mario Prost & Paul Kingsley Clark, Unity, Di-
versity and the Fragmentation of International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of
International Organizations Really Matter?, 5 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 341, pt. In (2006) (dis-
cussing whether international organizations make law).
66. See generally Brunn6e, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1; see also Brunn6e,
COPing with Consent, supra note 1.
67. Brunn6e, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1, at 118.
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II. EXPLORING THE LEGAL STATUS OF COP ACTIVITY
A. The Sources of International Law: Can Consensus-Based
COP Activity Be Hard Law?
For those ready to embrace the argument that COP activity is a sig-
nificant and currently undervalued source of international legal
obligation, the most obvious first step is to consider whether it can ap-
propriately fall within the two traditional categories of sources of
international law: treaty and custom." If so, it could be argued that con-
sensus-based COP activity could give rise to hard law and not just soft
law obligations. However, as we shall see, consensus-based COP activity
does not fit easily into either category.
Generally, a treaty is understood to be an agreement between states
that is intended to create obligations for those states under international
law.69 Although, as discussed below, some COP activity could be said to
be intended to have legal effects and to have been consented to by all
states parties to the treaty, we shall see that stretching this to a finding
that the parties have created a new international legal agreement is prob-
lematic. Some commentators have speculated that consensus-based COP
activity could amount to a subsequent agreement by the parties.7" Under
rules for interpretation of treaties, such agreements are recognized as
relevant to the interpretation of the original provisions of a treaty.7 ' How-
ever, this does not mean that this interpretive device would then
automatically elevate the activity to being seen as hard international law.
The second main category of hard law, customary international law,
might initially seem to pose more opportunity for legal status. Based on
a combination of state practice and opinio juris, this source seems to
provide an opportunity for more flexible reflection on intent and con-
sent.72 As interpreted by most commentators, customary international law
allows legal rules to emerge on the basis of broad consensus rather than
the consent of each state. The legal rules that emerge from this broad
68. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 4, art. 38(1). I have ex-
cluded general principles of law from this list because these refer to general principles of law
recognized in the domestic systems of states and are not applicable here.
69. See AusT, supra note 5, at 16, 20 (expanding on the definition of a treaty under the
VCLT art. 2(l)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, recognized as customary international
law, and the International Law Commission's Commentary to the Treaty); see also Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, at 39-44 (Dec. 19).
70. See, e.g., Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 641.
71. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(a).
72. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001).
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consensus are then binding on all states.73 More recent iterations of the
standards for customary international law have even appeared to elevate
statements above action for a finding of customary international law, and
allow for faster development of legally binding rules based on custom.
7 4
Under this approach, some commentators are willing to recognize the
possibility that declarations emanating from a U.N. conference or the
terms of resolutions from the General Assembly can give rise to custom-
ary international law.75 However, not all such activity can give rise to
customary international law: a custom's legal status is dependent on fac-
tors such as the degree of consent by states and the nature of the
activity.76 In other words, this status depends on whether the parties un-
derstand the activity to have legal relevance.7
What is the parties' understanding when they pass resolutions or de-
cisions at COPs? Is it analogous to the product of a U.N. sponsored
conference or a U.N. General Assembly resolution? The problem with
both categories of sources of international law-treaties and custom-is
that they provide a framework that does not fit with the reality of con-
sensus-based COP activity. Standards for whether an agreement amounts
to a treaty binding under international law or whether a declaration by a
U.N. sponsored conference or General Assembly resolution could give
rise to customary international law obligations are applicable to those
types of instruments because they are capable of existing as independent
legal obligations. It is therefore possible to focus on the intent of the
states that have drafted these documents to determine whether the parties
understood that they were creating new rules and understood that they
would have legal status.
The difficulty with applying these approaches to consensus-based
COP activity is that this activity is inextricably bound up with the under-
lying treaty obligations of the parties. 7' As we saw in the exploration of
consensus-based COP activity in Part I above, COPs affect the obliga-
tions of the parties through activity related to the underlying terms and
objective of the treaty. The significance of the COP activity for the par-
ties' obligations derives from the way in which that activity is connected
to the treaty and how it consequently affects that treaty's terms. This is
73. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529,
536-38 (1993).
74. Id. at 537; Roberts, supra note 72, at 758.
75. Chamey, supra note 73, at 537, 544-45; Roberts, supra note 72, at 758.
76. Roberts, supra note 72, at 758.
77. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1999).
78. Ulfstein seems to acknowledge this when he discusses the Kyoto Protocol. See
Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16, at 148.
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true whether the consensus-based COP activity is external or internal in
its focus. For example, new allocations for ozone-depleting substances
under the Montreal Protocol, or criteria for listing of species under
CITES or wetlands under the Ramsar Convention hold little meaning
without reference to the parties' underlying treaty obligations. Their sig-
nificance lies in how they relate to the underlying treaty obligations and
thereby shape them.
The exception to this interdependence highlights the rule. The Basel
Convention's decision banning the transport of waste from OECD to
non-OECD countries referred to in Part I above could exist as a stand-
alone legal rule. 9 It created a ban that was not contemplated by the terms
of the underlying treaty and could be said, therefore, to have departed
from the treaty. Because of its stand-alone nature, the decision can more
easily be evaluated under traditional tests for international law to deter-
mine whether it qualifies as a new international agreement or as
emerging customary international law. Had the parties all agreed about
the decision's legal status, it could be argued that the decision formed or
was close to forming new hard international law'0 capable of operating
independently of the treaty.
In turn, the fact that the parties did not all agree about the decision's
legal status after it had been passed counters an argument that it was
hard international law. The ultimate solution to the issue was to pass an
official amendment to the treaty at the next COP along the same terms as
the contentious decision.8' This amendment is subject to a consent-based
procedure, rather than a consensus-based one-it will only bind states
that have agreed to be bound by it.82
Consensus-based COP activity does not usually generate this level of
debate about its legal status, even though, as we have seen, it does influ-
ence the parties' obligations and activities under the treaty.83 This is
because most consensus-based COP activity cannot, as a factual matter,
79. See Decision 1112, Basel Convention, supra note 30.
80. The parties adopted Decision 11/12 by consensus. Concerns about the decision's
legal status were raised subsequently by some parties. See FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note
62, at 258; Werksman, supra note 31.
81. See Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, Ge-
neva, Switz., Sept. 18-22, 1995, Decision 111/1: Amendment to the Basel Convention, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35 (Nov. 28, 1995), available at http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/copl-
4/cop3decisions e.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); FITZMAURICE & ELIAS, supra note 62, at
258; Werksman, supra note 31, at 64-65.
82. Decision II/1 is not yet in force but will enter into force once ratified by three
fourths of the states parties that have accepted the amendment, and then only with respect to
the ratifying states. See Basel Convention, supra note 29, art. 17(5).
83. Cf Handl, supra note 31, 130-36 (describing examples in which the legal status of
COP activity and similar activity in MEAs has been the subject of disagreement).
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give rise to new independent legal obligations. Thus, as long as the par-
ties continue to be committed to the underlying treaty, they can shape its
direction through consensus-based COP activity without fearing a new
set of independent legal obligations. Although resolutions and decisions
are sometimes surrounded by vigorous debate, they do not give rise to new
stand-alone legal obligations that can be assessed independently of the
original treaty. It is therefore difficult to characterize consensus-based
COP activity as falling neatly within either treaty or custom as hard in-
ternational law.
B. A More Flexible Approach to Analyzing the Legal
Status of Consensus-Based COP Activity
These traditional categories of sources of international law have their
exceptions and flexible interpretations.84 Over the years, some commen-
tators have sought to move away from rigid categorizations of how we
should locate international legal obligation . One way to resolve the
problem of an overly rigid framework is to focus on certain attributes of
consensus-based COP activity that relate to the key concerns of interna-
tional lawyers engaged in a search for legal obligation: how to find
sovereign states bound by law without undermining their sovereign
status. As Koskenniemi describes it, it is the constant struggle between
concreteness and normativity, between apology and utopia.86
By breaking free of the conventional categories or definitions of
treaty and customary international law, we might analyze consensus-
based COP activity along a number of different axes that focus on
attributes such as consent, intent, and effect.87 Each of these axes could
84. See AUST, supra note 5, at 16 (warning "[tlhat the law of treaties is extremely flexi-
ble and can accommodate departures from normal practice"). See generally Roberts, supra
note 72 (demonstrating the wide range of views as to what makes up customary international
law).
85. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, in THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 9 (Stephen M. Schwebel ed., 1971). See gen-
erally Robert Y. Jennings, What Is International Law and How Do We Tell It when We See It?,
37 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 59 (1981) (F.R.G.) (discuss-
ing increased confusion about the sources of international law). See also Brunnre, Reweaving
the Fabric, supra note 1, at 118-23.
86. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 7-9
(1990) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law]; see also MARTri
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AR-
GUMENT (2005) [hereinafter KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA].
87. See Brunnre, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1, at 110-13 (discussing different
frameworks through which to view COP activity in the climate change regime: authorization,
language, and institutional law).
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then be used to provide a window into how we should understand a
given activity's legal status.
First, consensus-based COP activity could be evaluated according to
the degree of consent achieved in passing the resolution or decision.
Second, it might be discussed according to the degree of specific
authorization contained in the treaty-a kind of delegated consent.
Third, it could be broken down according to the degree of normative
force with which it is phrased. Fourth, consensus-based COP activity
could be discussed with reference to its effect on the obligations and im-
plementation of the treaty by the parties, perhaps distinguishing between
external and internal effects.
1. Axis 1: Voting and Level of Consent
One axis along which we might evaluate the legal status of consen-
sus-based COP activity is the degree of consent required and achieved
for the activity in question. In most instances, resolutions and decisions
are passed by consensus. In the absence of consensus, a treaty may re-
quire a majority or super-majority vote88 and, if the required majority is
achieved, consensus-based COP activity will become binding on all par-
ties, including those that did not agree to the provision or vote in favor of
it.
It is unclear whether consensus itself means unanimity.89 Whether or
not we equate consensus with unanimity in evaluating COP activity, a
resolution or decision passed by consensus can be said to have been con-
sented to by more states than a resolution or decision passed by super-
majority or majority vote. This axis provides, then, a sliding scale of
significance based on the degree of consent achieved for the resolution
or decision. 90
Using the axis of level of consent could allow us to argue that a reso-
lution or decision has achieved the status of either a new agreement
between the parties or some form of instant or emerging customary in-
ternational law.
88. See UNFCCC, supra note 8; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8; Ramsar Convention,
supra note 9, art. 7(2).
89. See Gardner, Perspectives on Wetlands, supra note 15, at 2-9 (discussing contro-
versy over the meaning of "consensus" at the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar
Convention).
90. It should be noted that it will not always be possible to identify which parties voted
for or against a particular provision due to the occasional use of secret ballots. However, par-
ties will often reveal their preferences in debates and might attach explanatory documents
clarifying their positions. This can happen even where a measure is passed by consensus.
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2. Axis 2: Level of Authorization by the
Treaty-Delegated Consent
COPs have authority from the treaty text to work on specific issues,
as well as general authority to further the implementation and effective-
ness of the treaty. Thus, another axis along which to evaluate COP
activity is the degree of general or specific authority pursuant to which a
COP is acting. 9'
Most treaty articles specifically creating a COP provide the COP with
general authority to perform tasks that will enhance the implementation
and the effectiveness of the treaty. For example, CITES authorizes its COP
to "review the implementation of the present Convention" and "where ap-
propriate, make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the
present Convention. ' '92 Similar language is contained in other MEAs.93
This general authorizing provision also tends to provide somewhat
open-ended powers related to particular aspects of the treaty. Thus, the
same article in CITES authorizes the COP to "make such provision as
may be necessary to enable the Secretariat to carry out its duties, and
adopt financial provisions; ... review the progress made towards the
restoration and conservation of the species included in Appendices I, II,
and III; [and] receive and consider any reports presented by the Secre-
tariat or by any Party."94
In addition, some treaties expressly authorize the COP to implement
specific aspects of the treaty. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer was amended in 1990 specifically to authorize
the COP to make amendments that did not require ratification to be bind-
ing.9 These specific authorizations can also take the form of authorizing
the COP to elaborate on aspects of the treaty that cut to the heart of the
treaty's mode of operation. In addition to its general authorization under
the treaty, the COP to the UNFCCC is charged throughout the treaty text
91. See Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16, at 150, 153 (arguing that internal law-
making by COPs should be regarded as binding on the COP, subsidiary bodies, and the Secre-
tariat, as well as states when acting within the treaty body).
92. CITES, supra note 9, art. XI(3).
93. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 7; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, art. 13; Ramsar
Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
94. CITES, supra note 9, art. XI(3). In addition, the COP is authorized to consider and
adopt amendments to Appendices I and H in accordance with Article XV. The relevant provi-
sions require a two thirds majority vote of the parties present and voting but allow for
reservations. Id. arts. XI(3)(b), XVI, XVII, XXIII. This is, therefore, a consent-based activity
rather than a consensus-based activity. See also Ramsar Convention, supra note 9, art. 6.
95. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 20 and accompanying text; Brunnde, Reweaving
the Fabric, supra note 1, at 110 (arguing that "Article 2.9 is remarkable in that it allows for
formally binding lawmaking by the Meeting of the Parties in relation to alterations of the
treaty's substance, indeed, of its central commitments").
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to perform a number of specific activities, including provisions for fi-
nancial mechanisms96 and parties' reports.97
The Kyoto Protocol, already more specific than its framework con-
vention, the UNFCCC, gives even more significant authority to its
version of the COP-the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Acting as
Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP). This COP/MOP is specifically au-
thorized by the Protocol to develop guidelines, modalities, procedures,
rules, and guidelines for the key provisions of the Protocol: its flexible
mechanisms of Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mecha-
nism, and an overall emissions trading scheme.98 As discussed in Part I
above, the COP has done substantial work in response to this mandate.
Thus, the legal status of consensus-based COP activity could be eva-
luated according to the degree of authorization contained in the treaty
itself, relying on a notion of consent to delegated law-making power.
Ulfstein, for example, argues that authorized internal rules should be
considered internally binding within the treaty regime.99 Here, one might
also differentiate between forms of authorization, so that generally au-
thorized activities could be perceived as less directly authorized and
therefore of a lesser legal status than specifically authorized activity.
This approach would echo how we view the activity of international or-
ganizations and is consistent with the treatment of COPs as international
organizations, as advocated by Churchill and Ulfstein. '°°
3. Axis 3: Level of Obligation Contained in the Language
of the COP Activity-Intent
Consensus-based COP activity also varies in the type of language
used to address the parties and in who is addressed-the states or sub-
sidiary bodies. Different types of language convey different intentions
and expectations about the degree of obligation and legal force contained
in the resolution or decision.°
96. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 11.
97. See, e.g., id. art. 12. The COP is the supreme body of the treaty and is given an
explicit mandate to direct the activity of the Secretariat and other subsidiary bodies. Id. arts.
7-10.
98. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 6, 12, 17. Brunnre, Reweaving the Fabric,
supra note 1, at 110-11 ("The design of this emissions trading regime is not merely a techni-
cal matter, it is at the very heart of the Kyoto Protocol. During the negotiations for the
protocol, international emissions trading was among the most controversial issues.").
99. Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16.
100. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1; see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text.
101. See Brunnde, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1, at 111.
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First, even the designation of something as a resolution or decision
can be significant. Some COPs differentiate between resolutions, deci-
sions, recommendations, and notifications, each one conveying varying
degrees of normative force. For example, the CITES COP produces
resolutions and decisions.'m Of these two categories of activity, resolu-
tions have the most overtly normative role, since they are used to provide
long-standing guidance on the treaty.' 3 By contrast, COP decisions are
used for instructions to subsidiary bodies, to be implemented by a speci-
fied time.
Second, and more importantly, even those forms that have the great-
est normative force-such as resolutions under CITES or decisions
under the Basel Convention-can vary significantly in their language.
For example, CITES Resolution 14.8 on Periodic Review of the Appen-
dices uses "shall," "should," "are encouraged," and "must" within the
same Resolution.' 5 By contrast, CITES Resolution 14.4 regarding coop-
eration between CITES and the International Tropical Timber
Organization uses the terms "urges," "encourages," and "recommends."'o°
Much of the Basel Convention's COP activity uses the term "requests"
and "invites" when addressing the parties.' 7
Sometimes differences in language seem to track whether a COP is
addressing parties directly with regard to their external obligations,
where less forceful language might be used, or whether it is addressing
its own internal operations or its subsidiary organs, where more forceful
language is used.' 8 For example, the Basel Convention tends to reserve
more forceful language for directives to its subsidiary bodies.' °9 This is
102. CITES Resolutions, http://www.cites.org/eng/res/intro.shtml (last visited Oct. 25,
2009); Decisions of the Conference of the Parties, http://www.cites.org/eng/dec/intro.shtml
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
103. Decisions of the Conference of the Parties, supra note 102.
104. Id.
105. See Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, The Hague,
Neth., June 3-15, 2007, Conf 14.8: Periodic Review of the Appendices, available at
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/14/14-08.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
106. See Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, The Hague,
Neth., Jun. 3-15, 2007, Conf. 14.4: Cooperation Between CITES and ITTO Regarding Trade
in Tropical limber, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/14/14-04.shtml (last visited Oct.
25, 2009).
107. See, e.g., Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Bali, Indon., June 23-27,
2008, Requests Directed at Parties and Other Stakeholders Contained in the Decisions of the
Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, available at http://www.basel.int/convention/
rfc/rfcCOP9.doc (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
108. See, e.g., Cooperation Between CITES and ITTO Regarding Trade in Tropical im-
ber, supra note 106 (using the term "directs" when addressing the Secretariat but "urges:'
"recommends," and "encourages" when addressing the parties directly).
109. Id. at2.
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not an exact correlation, however. For example, in CITES, the criteria for
listing-directed at states parties, who will both propose listing and vote
on listing proposals, and at the treaty's subsidiary bodies, who will
comment on listing proposals and sometimes make recommendations-
contain mandatory language throughout."
Finally, at the lowest level of normative force, COPs may authorize
or endorse guidance manuals produced by technical bodies. This guid-
ance is intended for use by domestic agencies and parties implementing
the treaty.111
This axis might be seen, then, as representing the intent of the par-
ties as to the normative force of the COP activity. As such, it is arguable
that COP resolutions using terms like "shall" have a harder legal status
than those that simply "urge" the parties to act. Using this axis, these
latter would be regarded as soft law or as reflecting political rather than
legal commitments.
4. Axis 4: Effect in Implementation
A fourth axis along which to evaluate consensus-based COP activ-
ity's legal status is that of effect. Do the parties implement these COP
resolutions and decisions or act as though they are legally binding? 1
2
For this inquiry, the discussion of Part I above might be combined
with empirical work about how the parties implement the convention and
what significance they accord the resolutions and decisions of COPs."3
Following this axis as a measure of legal status, we might also determine
that external effects are more legally significant than internal effects be-
cause they have a more direct effect on the parties and are therefore
likely to have more effect on implementation. Following this view, the
mix of internal and external effects would fall somewhere in the middle
of the axis.
5. Using the Axes to Determine Legal Status
The four axes-intentionally placed in an order that produces a slid-
ing scale from consent to effects-based determinations of their legal
status-provide a potential means of assessing the international legal
110. CITES Criteria, supra note 44.
Ill. See, e.g., Ramsar Handbooks, supra note 37.
112. This assessment has analogies to the approach of some legal pluralists. See Paul
Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155 (2007).
113. Although Brunnte does not directly address effects, her use of the term "de facto
law-making" raises the possibility of a form of legal status afforded this activity because of its
practical significance. See Brunnde, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1; cf. Ulfstein, Com-
ment, supra note 16.
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status of consensus-based COP activity. Following consent-based models
of varying strictness, our assessment of the legal status of this activity
could focus on the degree of consent achieved or the level of authorization
for the COP activity that represents consent for delegated rule-making
(Axes 1 and 2). Still within a consent-based model, albeit a less strict
one, we might focus on the intent expressed by the parties as to the legal
status of the resolution or decision (Axis 3). Moving away from a con-
sent-based model, we could evaluate legal status by reference to the
effect of the COP activity on the parties (Axis 4).
Any temptation to use a single axis to determine legal status should
be avoided. While each axis offers some insight into the legal status of a
particular COP resolution or decision, a single axis alone cannot give us
a sufficiently rich picture of the relationship of consensus-based COP
activity to international legal obligation. Further, the selection of one
axis over another inevitably involves the selection of either an apologist
or a utopian perspective on international legal obligation.''
4
Take, for example, Axis 2, which considers how the level of authori-
zation for COP activity contained in the treaty affects the status of this
activity. This axis simply provides us with information about whether the
COP itself has acted within the scope of its powers but not about the
normative force of the activity. For some, this amount of information is
sufficient. For example, Ulfstein argues that authorized activity can be
considered legally binding, while unauthorized activity has legally bind-
ing status only within the internal operation of the treaty."5 However,
relying on this axis alone might lead to a finding of hard law even where
that was not intended by the parties voting on the decision or resolution.
Further, even if a COP resolution inconsistent with treaty authorizations
might be ultra vires according to the law of international organizations,
it might nevertheless be considered hard law by virtue of a sufficient
level of consent and demonstration of intent by the voting parties. The
fact that the Basel Convention's decision regarding trade in waste be-
tween OECD and non-OECD countries was likely ultra vires does not
alone negate the possibility that other factors could have led commenta-
tors to view it as legally binding. Thus, the level of authorization and the
framework of the law of international organizations can only be one fac-
tor in analyzing the legal status of COP activity.
Relying solely on intent as expressed by the language of the COP
resolution or decision is also insufficient. If a COP resolution phrased in
114. See Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra note 86, at 12; KOSKEN-
NIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 86.
115. Cf Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16, at 148-5 1.
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obligatory language can be regarded as hard law (or almost hard law)
simply on the basis of language, this might suggest that COP activity
could stand alone as an independent provision. Sometimes, this might be
true. However, the substance of most COP activity rarely stands separate
from the underlying treaty. The criteria for listing species under CITES,
for example-although written using mandatory language-cannot stand
apart from the underlying treaty's listing procedure.
The same problem applies when relying only on the consent axis.
For a stand-alone provision like Decision 11/12 of the Basel Convention,
consent could be the key determinant. However, for most consensus-
based COP decisions, their connection to the underlying treaty obliga-
tions makes it difficult to determine whether consent to the provision
itself includes consent that it give rise to a new stand-alone legal rule.
Finally, reliance on effect alone threatens to undermine the value of
legal obligation completely, in favor of a realist view of international• 116
relations ---or, to put it in Koskenniemi's terms, it offers an apologist
perspective of international law."7 Even those inclined toward a broad
reading of intent might shy away from a reading that relies only on effect
to determine the legal status of an instrument.
Any one axis alone is insufficient to answer the question of whether
COP activity should be regarded as hard international law because each
axis highlights one aspect of the sources of international law while ne-
gating or ignoring others. Relying on one axis to determine legal status
risks both over- and underinclusiveness. And each axis could be used to
find that a particular COP resolution or decision is hard international law
in a way that misunderstands the nature of COP activity.
The simple response is that all axes should be relevant to a determi-
nation of the legal status of consensus-based COP activity. So what
happens when we combine the axes and try to apply them? The mix of
consent, intent, and effects actually illuminates the way in which COP
activity operates within the treaty. The way in which all of these axes
operate within the context of analyzing consensus-based COP activity is
different from the way in which they would operate in relation to inde-
pendent, stand-alone normative statements.
Each axis serves the particular context of COP activity. Consent is
consent to the COP activity's effect on the underlying treaty, whether
direct or delegated. Intent here is directed specifically at how the parties
116. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401
(2000); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
581, 589 (2005); Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16, at 149.
117. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, supra note 86; KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 86.
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and subsidiary organs implement and interpret treaty provisions. And ef-
fects relate to the effects of the COP activity on the parties' original
obligations. Combining the axes to consider the legal status of a particular
example of consensus-based COP activity highlights this particular con-
text.
The significance of COP activity lies in both its relationship to the
parties' underlying legal obligations under the treaty and the intent of
those parties. COP activity is significant when it thickens the original
treaty obligations and when it is intended to thicken them. As part of this
thickening, it can deepen the obligations by contributing to effectiveness
and compliance. It can add fullness to them by elaborating on the frame-
work provided by the text of the treaty through interpretations and
guidance. This thickening can happen even if a COP resolution is
couched in non-mandatory terms, when it affects only the internal obli-
gations of the parties, or when it is only generally authorized."8
Consensus-based COP activity is inseparable from and should be
viewed in relation to the party's underlying treaty obligations. Analyzing
consensus-based COP activity according to all four axes helpfully illus-
trates the complexity of consensus-based COP activity, while also
demonstrating that attempts to analyze COP activity according to con-
ventional standards for finding legal obligation are fraught with
difficulty.
When we ask whether consensus-based COP activity is hard interna-
tional law within these conventional standards, we become caught in a
set of questions far removed from the context of parties' decisionmaking
at COPs. This in turn suggests that a one-size-fits-all determination of
their legal status or relationship to underlying treaty obligations is im-
possible.
We need then, a new question. But before we can determine what
that question should be, we must consider whether the more usual ap-
proach of classifying consensus-based COP activity as soft law proves
118. One way to understand this argument is using the framework proposed by Abbott et
al. in their discussion of legalization. See Abbott et al., supra note 116. The authors define
legalization in terms of obligation, precision, and delegation. Using these three dimensions, it
is possible to locate the degree of legalization of a particular regime along a continuum. Id. at
401-02. Of the three characteristics, delegation is the most significant for our purposes, since
it means "that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the
rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules." Id. at 401. Although the au-
thors are primarily focused on dispute resolution in their discussion of delegation, id. at 415,
the notion of delegation as they define it could also be applied to the work of COPs. Using this
framework, then, we could see the activity of COPs as contributing the delegation characteris-
tic of legalization, thereby "hardening" the legal effect of the parties' original treaty
obligations.
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any more helpful for understanding this activity's role in the interna-
tional legal system.
C. Placing Consensus-Based COP Activity Within
the Soft Law Debate
Commentators generally refer to the consensus-based resolutions
and decisions of COPs as soft law, perhaps to avoid some of the prob-
lems with applying standard tests for finding hard international law to
this activity." 9 After all, if consensus-based COP activity is not hard
law-or rarely hard law-why not simply refer to it as soft law and
move on? This Part argues that despite some initial appeal of the term
soft law for this kind of COP activity, it is ultimately unhelpful for a full
understanding of the relationship between consensus-based COP activity
and the parties' substantive legal obligations under the underlying treaty.
Much activity in the international system that cannot be classified as
international law under traditional categories appears to have normative
implications, including legally normative implications."0 Recognizing
this, commentators have relied on the notion of soft law to fill in the gap
between non-law and traditional hard law:
"Soft" law certainly constitutes part of the contemporary law-
making process but, as a social phenomenon, it evidently over-
flows the classical and familiar legal categories by which
scholars usually describe and explain both the creation and the
legal authority of international norms. In other words, "soft" law
is a trouble maker because it is either not yet or not only law.'
2
'
Soft law can be classified as such on the basis of either its form or its
substance. Focusing on form, the term is used to describe statements and
resolutions that do not fall within definitions of a treaty "because the
parties to it do not intend it to be legally binding.' '122 As they do not meet
the formal requirements of a treaty, these instruments cannot be consid-
ered law under traditional categories. Examples include General
119. See, e.g., Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft
Law, 48 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 901, 905 (1999); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of
International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 352 (describing the work of COPs as one of
the most important sources of soft law).
120. See Boyle, supra note 119, at 902, 906-07; C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft
Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 865-66
(1989) [hereinafter Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law]; Weiss, supra note 119, at 352-53.
121. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 420 (1991).
122. Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787, 787 (1986).
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Assembly resolutions and declarations. In international environmental
law, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations could both fall within the cate-
gory of soft law.
13
More contentiously, some commentators also argue that an instru-
ment might be considered soft law because of its substance. Here, even if
the form of the instrument resembles that of a hard legal commitment
such as a treaty, if the substance is insufficiently precise or determinate
to hold the parties to any clearly understood obligation, the instrument
might be deemed soft law.
24
If these instruments do not meet the formal requirements of interna-
tional law, why would they be termed law at all? Commentators
frequently focus on the significance of the so-called soft law instrument
for hard law. They assert that soft law may contribute to the development
of hard law, actually becoming hard law over time 25 by providing a
framework for a subsequent treaty '16 or by serving as an authoritative
statement of states' views that might then serve as evidence of customary
international law or crystallize into customary international law. 
2
1
Dupuy notes that soft law "can help to define the standards of good
behavior corresponding to what is nowadays to be expected from a
'well-governed State' without having been necessarily consecrated as an
in-force customary norm."' 28 Soft law instruments can have an impact on
national legislatures and national legislation. 29 International standards
based on soft law are available for use by international and municipal
judges or arbitrators, and can be of use in everyday interstate diplo-
130
macy.
123. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-
14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1
(June 13, 1992); U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16,
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONE48/14 (June 16, 1972).
124. Boyle, supra note 119, at 907; Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the
International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 21, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter
Chinkin, Normative Development]; Dupuy, supra note 121, at 430.
125. Dupuy, supra note 121, at 433; see also Boyle, supra note 119, at 905.
126. See Boyle, supra note 119, at 904; Jennings, supra note 85.
127. Boyle, supra note 119, at 906; Chinkin, Normative Development, supra note 124, at
32.
128. Dupuy, supra note 121, at 434.
129. Id. at 434.
130. Id. at 434-35.
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Thus, for Dupuy, the reason to take soft law seriously is its indirect
effect on and relationship to more traditionally recognized hard law. 3' As
he says:
Albeit indirect, the legal effect of "soft" law is nevertheless real.
"Soft" law is not merely a new term for an old (customary) proc-
ess; it is both a sign and product of the permanent state of
multilateral cooperation and competition among the heterogene-
ous members of the contemporary world community.
32
Or, as Klabbers, a critic of the term puts it, "[t]he term soft law, thus (ad-
mittedly loosely) delimited, denotes those instruments which are to be
considered as giving rise to legal effects, but do not (or not yet, perhaps)
amount to real law.'
33
The work of COPs is generally considered to fit easily within the
category of soft law. Boyle, writing about treaties and soft law, refers to
the activities of COPs within his explanation of soft law's role.' 4 He ar-
gues that "although of themselves these instruments may not be legally
binding, their interaction with related treaties may transform their legal
status into something more."'35 He observes that soft law may provide the
detailed rules and technical standards required for implementation of
some treaties, thus buttressing the obligation of a treaty.3 6 Other com-
mentators also generally refer to consensus-based COP activity as soft
law, usually in passing before moving on to discuss in greater depth the
substance of the activity in question.
37
131. Id. at 435; see also Boyle, supra note 119, at 901-13 (discussing the "subtle and
diverse" relationship between soft law and treaties).
132. Dupuy, supra note 121, at 435. These instruments remain classified as soft law
because they are still regarded as non-binding. "The adoption of non-binding normative in-
struments by international organizations and non-state actors reflects the growing complexity
of the international legal system, in which states no longer have an exclusive role, but have yet
to relinquish full law-making functions to other entities. The result is normative content in
non-binding form." Alexandre Kiss, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
223, 228 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
133. Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDC J. INT'L L. 167, 168 (1996).
There may also be a normative push to recognize soft law because of the advantages it might
have when compared to hard law. As Boyle observes, "soft law instruments will normally be
easier to amend or replace than treaties, particularly when all that is required is the adoption of
a new resolution by an international institution. Treaties take time to replace or amend, and the
attempt to do so can result in an awkward and overlapping network of old and new obligations
between different sets of parties." Boyle, supra note 119, at 903.
134. Boyle, supra note 119, at 905.
135. Id. at 906.
136. Id. at 905.
137. See, e.g., Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 641.
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Describing COP activity as soft law could be the end of the discus-
sion. However, criticisms from non-believers, as well as a closer
examination of the relationship of consensus-based COP activity to the
underlying treaty obligations, suggest that something is missing from
this description. Over the years, commentators have argued that the
concept of soft law lacks a coherent theoretical underpinning,'38 lacks
support in state practice,'3 or threatens the integrity of the international
legal system as a system of laws.' 4°
Critics of the notion of soft law frequently focus on the binary as-
pects of legal obligation: something is either law or not law.'
4
'
Reinforcing this with a focus on intent also suggests that something that
states did not intend to be law cannot be considered a different form of
law simply because a commentator might prefer that outcome. 4 2 Even
those who acknowledge that it may not always be easy to distinguish
between what is law and what is not law, or what is prelegal and what is
legal, may resist the urge to dilute the effect of designating something as
law by allowing the "grey zone" to be recognized as a kind of law.
43
Supporting his argument that the notion of soft law is logically inco-
herent, Klabbers observes that even if courts do sometimes seem to
recognize soft law and use it in their deliberations, they do so only by
elevating soft law to hard law in order to make it hierarchically equiva-
lent to the law they must apply.'" Thus, even if soft law considerations
stand at the origins of norms, "at some point during their existence as
norms they are inevitably transformed into either hard law or non-law.
Even if soft law would play a role in law-making ... ,it does not play a
role in the application of law."'
' 45
These criticisms provide two important lessons when considering
how we should think about consensus-based COP activity. First, they
138. Klabbers, supra note 133, at 168.
139. Id.; Raustiala, supra note 116, at 587.
140. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 Am. J. INT'L
L. 413, 441 (1983). Weil fears that failure to abide by the procedural formalities of interna-
tional law creation might lead to an unequal international legal system, whereby "[t]hose
privileged to partake of that legislative power are in a position to make sure that their own
hierarchy of values prevails and to arrogate the right of requiring others to observe it." Id.
141. Raustiala, supra note 116, at 586 (claiming "that legality is best understood as a
binary, rather than a continuous, attribute"); Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy i: Interna-
tional Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 320-21 (2006). But cf Chinkin, Normative
Development, supra note 124, at 32 (describing categories of hard and soft law as lying within
a continuum that itself is constantly evolving).
142. Raustiala, supra note 116, at 590.
143. Weil, supra note 140, at 417-18.
144. Klabbers, supra note 133, at 172-77.
145. Id. at 179.
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suggest that even the more fluid approach to international legal obliga-
tion reflected by proponents of the concept of soft law is subject to
hierarchies of norms. Even if they are unwilling to see this activity as
non-law, soft law proponents still accept that it is not hard law. Thus the
binary classification of legal obligation becomes a tripartite classifica-
tion.
Yet this tripartite classification-hard law, soft law, non-law-does
not adequately capture the particular relationship that COP activity has
with the underlying legal obligation of the treaty. For, to the extent that
COP resolutions and decisions thicken treaty obligations, it is no longer
possible to argue that the treaty obligation is hierarchically superior to
the COP obligation. Instead, they are inextricably intertwined.
Some commentators seem to recognize this when they argue that
treaty interpretation provisions might allow for COP resolutions and de-
cisions to be taken into account as subsequent agreements of the parties
under the provisions on interpretation contained in Article 3 l(3)(a) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).' 46 COP resolutions
and decisions would then be relevant for interpretation of the parties'
original agreement. This is discussed in more detail in Part IV below.
However, using COP activity to interpret an underlying treaty obligation
would not necessarily change the status of the particular COP activity at
issue from soft to hard law or mean that all consensus-based COP activ-
ity should automatically be regarded as hard law. Yet, following
Klabbers, once a court is willing to use COP activity to interpret an un-
derlying treaty obligation, it would be incoherent to suggest that the
COP activity remains soft law. 47
However, Klabbers' approach suggests that it is only at the moment
of interpretation of a treaty provision by a dispute resolution body that
COP activity can be converted to hard law. This explanation fails to cap-
ture the reality of the international legal system. It suggests that in the
absence of a tribunal declaring what the law is, the parties exist in a
nebulous world without clear, hard obligations. This does not, however,
reflect the practice of parties to treaties. Where consensus-based COP
activity thickens the underlying treaty obligation, it does so without ever
passing through the hands of a dispute resolution body relying on provi-
sions of the VCLT for interpretation. Both external and internal
decisionmaking shape the expectations and obligations of the parties in
relation to each other under the treaty regime.
146. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(a).
147. See Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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Using the term soft law to capture this relationship thereby threatens
to diminish the effect of consensus-based activity on hard treaty obliga-
tions. It is not the underlying motivation of some of the proponents of
the term soft law that is problematic; many of them advocate a far more
contextual and rich approach to defining international legal obligation
than either the binary or tripartite perspective seems to allow. 48 It is that
in the hands of the debate, the initial question of whether a type of activ-
ity should be categorized as hard law, soft law, or non-law takes on a
significance that obscures the reality of what it describes.
The depiction of COP activity as soft law obscures what COP activ-
ity is actually doing in relation to the underlying treaty obligation.
Consensus-based COP activity is so tightly bound up with the original
legal obligation of the treaty that its relationship is materially different
from the relationship of soft law to hard law described by commentators
above (or that is reflected by General Assembly resolutions and declara-
tions of U.N.-sponsored conferences or private actors). COP activity
does not create norms, whether legally binding or not. Yet it also does
not stand removed from normative legal obligations. Rather, it thickens
the original legal obligation. As such, even the tripartite notion of hard
law, soft law, and non-law is insufficient to capture its legal significance.
These problems arise because the soft law/hard law debate asks the
wrong question. It asks: Is this law or is this politics? And if it is not
hard law, can it then be described as another form of law, albeit hierar-
chically inferior? Again, the question suggests that we can evaluate
consensus-based COP activity as if it had independent normative-and
possibly legally normative-status, misunderstanding the way in which
COP activity contributes to parties' normative obligations.
By contrast, the question we need to ask if we want to accurately re-
flect the role of consensus-based COP activity for states' international
legal obligations is: What is the relationship of consensus-based COP
activity to the underlying treaty obligations of the parties to that treaty?
III. CONSEQUENCES OF REFRAMING THE QUESTION
What happens when we change the question from one asking wheth-
er consensus-based COP activity is international law to one asking what
relationship this activity has to the parties' underlying treaty obligations?
Refraining the question in this way allows us to explore the particular
148. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 119, at 901-05; Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law,
supra note 120, at 865-66; Dupuy, supra note 121, at 435; Schachter, supra note 85, at 30-31.
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relation that COP activity has to underlying treaty obligations, using all
four axes.
With this approach, not all consensus-based COP activity will be
seen as having an intended effect on the parties' obligations. Indeed,
some COP activity will be sufficiently independent of the parties' under-
lying treaty obligations that it will not be subject to this different
approach. For example, Decision 11/12 of the Basel Convention regard-
ing the transport of waste between OECD and non-OECD countries
could be regarded, on this approach, as so distinct from the underlying
treaty's approach that it cannot be considered as having a tight enough
relationship with the parties' treaty obligations to warrant evaluating its
status as law under anything other than the conventional categories.
Even for those unwilling to consider that consensus-based COP ac-
tivity could be considered hard law, reframing the question allows for a
more nuanced approach to international legal obligation and a more
careful inquiry into what parties intend. Parties almost certainly do not
intend to create new stand-alone legal obligations. However, they also
almost certainly do not intend for COP activities to have no effect on the
treaty.
Two different tribunal decisions highlight the different results that
ensue from reframing the question we ask about consensus-based COP
activity. Both decisions, one from the United States and the other from
the Netherlands, address the legal status of COP resolutions or decisions
and their relationship to the original treaty obligation of the state party.
In each case, the outcome turns at least in part on the characterization of
this COP activity as binding or not binding on the parties. Each tribunal
took a different approach. Although this difference may be at least partly
attributable to the constitutional structure of each country and the place
of international law in its domestic legal system, the way in which each
tribunal dealt with the consensus-based COP activity at issue was suffi-
ciently different to warrant comment.
A. National Resources Defense Council v.
Environmental Protection Agency
49
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reheard a case
brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenging
the Environmental Protection Agency's rules regarding methyl bromide.
The NRDC argued that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had
violated decisions of the COP to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
149. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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that Deplete the Ozone Layer that had changed a number of provisions
applicable to the states parties' production of methyl bromide. ° The
changes had not been made by formal adjustment, a procedure recog-
nized in the Montreal Protocol and requiring consent by a state to be
enforceable against that state. Rather the changes had been made by de-
cision of the Montreal Protocol's COP.'
51
The United States had incorporated the treaty into U.S. law through
the Clean Air Act, and had made specific provision for automatic incor-
poration of formal adjustments and amendments to the Protocol.'52 The
Clean Air Act said nothing, however, about COP activity that did not fall
into either of those categories.'53
In the initial briefing, only the petitioner-the NRDC-spent any
time on the legal status of the COP decisions."'4 This is surprising, since
the respondent-the EPA-would have benefited more from the argu-
ment. Even the NRDC's discussion on the issue was limited. Although
both parties agreed that the decisions did not count as formal adjust-
ments, they focused the bulk of their attention in initial briefing on the
question of whether the EPA had complied or not complied with the re-
quirements of these COP decisions rather than on the legal status of
those decisions. 55
The D.C. court, however, took a different approach. After oral argu-
ment, it ordered supplemental briefing specifically on the question of the
legal status of the COP decisions.'56 In its decision, the court concen-
trated its argument on the fact that the incorporating statute within the
United States did not explicitly incorporate subsequent changes to the
requirements of the Protocol that did not fall within the category of
amendments or adjustments. Although much of the court's analysis fo-
cused on U.S. constitutional requirements that would not allow
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 4-5.
152. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q.
153. NRDC, 464 F.3d at 8.
154. Final Opening Brief for Petitioner at 23-25, NRDC, 464 F.3d 1; cf Final Brief for
the Respondent, NRDC, 464 F.3d I (No. 04-1438); Final Reply Brief for Petitioner, NRDC,
464 E3d I (No. 04-1438). In supplemental briefing ordered by the court after oral argument,
both parties addressed the legal status of the COP decisions. See Supplemental Brief for Peti-
tioner at 3, NRDC, 464 F.3d I (No. 04-1438); Supplemental Brief for the Respondent, NRDC,
464 F.3d I (No. 04-1438).
155. Final Reply Brief for Petitioner, NRDC, 464 E3d 1 (No. 04-1438); Final Brief for
the Respondent, NRDC, 464 F.3d I (No. 04-1438); Final Opening Brief for Petitioner, NRDC,
464 F.3d 1 (No. 04-1438).
156. See NRDC, 464 F.3d at 5; Supplemental Brief for Petitioner, NRDC, 464 F.3d 1
(No. 04-1438); Supplemental Brief for the Respondent, NRDC, 464 F.3d 1 (No. 04-1438).
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automatic incorporation of the new provisions, 57 two aspects of its anal-
ysis are worth noting here.
The court determined that it could not use the decisions of the COPs
as interpretive devices relevant as subsequent practice of the parties un-
less there were ambiguity in the original agreement. 8 Since these new
methyl bromide provisions substantively changed the original obliga-
tions of the parties, it would not make sense to view the first allocations
as ambiguous or the second set as filling in gaps in the first set.'
Further, although it was not necessary to its holding, the court
stressed that the new requirements constituted a political agreement be-
tween the parties because they had not gone through formal amendments
or adjustments and because the parties had not invoked compliance me-
chanisms against the United States.' 6° The new allocations had not been
agreed to following the formal legal requirements for amendments or
adjustments and could not, therefore, be viewed as reflecting the intent
of the parties to be bound by them.
6
'
The two different ways discussed in this Article of asking the ques-
tion about consensus-based COP activity's legal status suggest a reason
for this outcome. The court's focus on the original obligation and any
ambiguity in that obligation left the court in turn having to determine the
legal status of COP decisions that, as we have seen, would not otherwise
fall within the traditional categories of international legal obligation.
Viewing the two obligations as independent meant that the court had to
decide both whether the modifications were law or non-law-with no
room for soft law to have legal effect in this tribunal setting-and what
the hierarchical status of the modifications was as compared to the origi-
nal treaty obligation.
It is not hard to see that a tribunal faced with the question in this way
would place the original treaty obligation on a higher hierarchical level
than the subsequent modification agreed to by consensus of the parties.
Had the court been willing to frame the question differently, how-
ever, it might have reached a different conclusion. If it had asked what
relationship the COP activity had to the parties' original treaty obliga-
tions, there would have been room to consider the COP activity as
modifying the original obligation. Focusing on the relationship between
the two instruments takes away the need to determine a hierarchy of le-
gal norms-or to choose a single axis along which to test legality. This,
157. NRDC, 464 E3d at 8-9.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id.
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in turn, might have negated the constitutional arguments that the modifi-
cations had not been incorporated into U.S. law, because it would have
treated the COP activity as inextricably bound up with the original
commitments of the United States under the Montreal Protocol, incorpo-
rated into U.S. law through legislation. 62
Primarily, the D.C. court decision suggests that when COP activity is
assessed according to the straight question of whether it is law, there is
little room to see the way in which COP activity contributes to the par-
ties' underlying treaty obligations and the way in which it is intended to
contribute to those obligations.
B. Lac Wetland Case 63
In 2007, the Netherlands Crown issued an opinion with regard to ob-
ligations under the Ramsar Convention that took a very different
approach to COP resolutions.' 6 The question for the Crown was whether
the Competent Authority for the Island of Bonaire, part of the Nether-
lands Antilles, had failed to comply with obligations under the Ramsar
162. The court's own example of what it considered an analogous situation highlights
this point again:
To illustrate, suppose the President signed and the Senate ratified a treaty with
Germany and France to conserve fossil fuel. How this is to be accomplished the
treaty does not specify. In a later meeting of representatives of the signatory coun-
tries at the United Nations, a consensus is reached to lower the speed limits on all
major highways of the signatory nations to a maximum of 45 miles per hour. No
one would say that United States law has thus been made.
Id. at9.
163. See Jonathan M. Verschuuren, Ramsar Soft Law Is Not Soft at All, available at
http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/wurc/wurc-verschuuren bonaire.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2009)
[hereinafter Verschuuren, Soft Law] (translating and summarizing the Netherlands Crown
Decision of Sept. 11, 2007 in the case lodged by Competent Authority for the Island of Bon-
aire concerning the annulment of two of its decisions on the Lac wetland by the Governor of
the Netherlands Antilles). This piece is an informal translation of Verschuuren's case law an-
notation in Dutch. See Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar art. 3, 35 MILIEU & RECHT 28
(2008) (Neth.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar]. Refer-
ences are provided to both the English and Dutch versions of Verschuuren's case law
annotation. The decision itself has not been published.
164. I rely on Verschuuren's case law annotations for a window into the Crown's reason-
ing in this case. See generally Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163; Verschuuren, Verdrag
van Ramsar, supra note 163. Although the Crown is not a court, in this case it was acting in a
judicial capacity to resolve a challenge to decisions by the Competent Authority for the Island
of Bonaire, part of the Netherlands Antilles. Through a provision in Dutch law, challenges to
decisions of the Governor of the Netherlands Antilles are made to the Crown rather than to the
courts that usually deal with appeals in administrative cases (i.e., the Afdeling Betuurs-
rechtspraak van de Raad van State, or the Administrative Jurisdiction Division). See
Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 3; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar, supra note
163, at 33.
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Convention because it had failed to complete environmental impact as-
sessments (EIAs). 65 The text of the Ramsar Convention does not require
ElAs explicitly.' 66 However, COPs to the Convention had elaborated on
the "wise use" obligations of the parties and had concluded resolutions
and recommendations that included an obligation to perform EIAs.
167
The Crown drew on these COP resolutions and recommendations in
its decision.' 68 The Crown stated that they added to the duties laid down
in the Convention itself and were particularly important because the
treaty text itself was so sparse. 169 The Crown referred to the VCLT provi-
sions on interpretation, discussed further below, and noted that a tribunal
could, under Article 31 (3)(a) take into account subsequent agreements of
the parties to the treaty when interpreting the treaty.'7° The Crown also
noted that the resolutions and recommendations had been adopted by
unanimous vote in which the Netherlands had participated. 7 'The Crown
concluded that the resolutions and recommendations regarding environ-
mental impact assessments were therefore binding on the Netherlands. 7
2
Accordingly, a failure to perform EIAs as required by these resolutions
and recommendations amounted to a failure to comply with the Ramsar
Convention itself.
73
While this decision was in part possible because the Crown deter-
mined that the Ramsar Convention was automatically binding on the
Dutch authorities, without the need for incorporation through domestic
law, 74 this alone cannot explain the difference in outcome between the
Dutch decision and that of the U.S. Court in NRDC v. EPA. Had the
Dutch Crown viewed the COP resolutions and recommendations as
165. See Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 3; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 33.
166. See Ramsar Convention, supra note 9.
167. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 1-3; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 28-29, 30-31.
168. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2-3; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 30-32.
169. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 32.
170. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 31-32.
171. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2, 5; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 32, 34. It is unclear whether the Crown had actual evidence of a unanimous
vote or whether it conflated consensus with unanimity.
172. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 32.
173. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 32.
174. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2, 4; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 32-33.
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merely political commitments, as the U.S. Court did, it could have easily
dismissed the charge that the Netherlands was failing to comply with its
Ramsar obligations. Indeed, if the Crown had begun with this view, it
could have been faced with a picture of two competing norms-one re-
quiring assessment and the other with no such requirement. It would
then have had to rank them hierarchically.
75
Yet the Crown does not appear to have approached the question this
way. Instead, it seems to have asked what the resolutions were intended
to contribute to the legal obligations of the parties under the original
treaty.176 Asking the question in this way left open the possibility that the
resolutions and recommendations be seen as inextricably linked to the
original treaty obligations. As such, the Crown could apply the resolu-
tions and recommendations to the state party without in any way
explicitly overriding the original treaty.
Why the difference? It is arguable that instead of focusing on formal
classifications of whether COP activity could be considered law, the
Netherlands Crown focused on the relationship between the COP resolu-
tions and the original treaty obligation.
Implicitly the Crown was asking not whether the resolutions were
law, but rather what the relationship of the resolutions and recommenda-
tions was to the party's international legal obligations under the treaty.
As such, the Crown left room for the resolutions and recommendations
to be considered part of the states parties' legal obligations under the
treaty. And the Crown was able to do this without having to answer
whether these resolutions could stand alone outside of their connection
to the wise use obligation of the Ramsar Convention.
175. This cannot be attributed solely to a difference in the original obligation allowing
the Crown to apply the VCLT's provisions on subsequent agreements because the very act of
recognizing the COP resolutions and recommendations is what creates the possibility for ap-
plying them as a subsequent agreement.
176. This reading is consistent with the Crown's acknowledgement that the resolutions
and recommendations were "especially important because Article 3 [of the Ramsar Conven-
tion] itself does not offer much to hold on to." Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2; see
also supra note 175; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar, supra note 163, at 32.
177. Verschuuren, Soft Law, supra note 163, at 2-3; Verschuuren, Verdrag van Ramsar,
supra note 163, at 32. It could be argued that the difference between the U.S. and Dutch deci-
sion-making bodies lay in their emphasis on different axes for assessing legal status: that is,
intent, as expressed by form, versus consent, as expressed by equating consensus with una-
nimity. However, this distinction cannot fully explain the different attitudes of the tribunals
because the choice of axis itself likely depended on the significance each tribunal was willing
to give to the COP activity in the first place.
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REFRAMING THE QUESTION FOR
FRAGMENTATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
What are the broader implications of changing the question we ask
about consensus-based COP activity? If we view consensus-based COP
activity as activity that thickens the parties' legal obligations under trea-
ties, we begin to see a picture of the international legal system that is
somewhat different from the tripartite picture of hard law commitments,
soft law commitments, and political commitments.
We now see a picture of MEAs with a set of legal obligations that
are tailored to the treaty. To the extent that consensus-based COP activity
enriches the original commitments of the parties, it contributes to the
development of specialized regimes with thick legal obligations that are
adaptable, shifting over time as the parties develop them through COPs
and their subsidiary organs. This picture, in turn, has implications for our
picture of fragmentation in the international legal system and how we
manage that fragmentation. It also has implications for accountability.
A. Adaptability
Relying on consensus-based decisionmaking to develop the obliga-
tions of the parties to a treaty allows for a degree of flexibility and
adaptability in law-making that is not true of treaty-making."' This in
turn allows for the development of regimes that can respond to changes
in scientific knowledge or can even provide for processes to manage un-
certainty without needing to begin afresh with a new treaty.79 Although
some of this adaptability and flexibility is reflected in the rise of frame-
work conventions that provide for the negotiation of protocols, even
these cannot compete with the ability of COPs to respond to new scien-
tific information.
Indeed, many of the examples of activity discussed in Part I reflect
shifts in understanding of environmental problems and advances in un-
derstanding of how to manage them. Thus, changes to the criteria for
listing under the Ramsar Convention and CITES draw on changes in
178. This point is frequently made with regard to soft law instruments in general. See,
e.g., Boyle, supra note 119, at 903, 905; Dupuy, supra note 121, at 421; Chinkin, The Chal-
lenge of Soft Law, supra note 120, at 851, 852-53, 860 (observing that the process of
negotiating soft law instruments can be as complex and lengthy as the process of negotiating
treaties); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibili-
ties, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 61, 78-80 (2005) [hereinafter Koskcnnicmi, International Legislation
Today] (discussing the increasing "deformalisation" of international law today).
179. Boyle, supra note 119, at 905; Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 1, 5 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997).
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scientific understanding about wetlands and their place in the ecosystem
and changes in knowledge about species' viability, respectively.
Amended allocations of methyl bromide under the Montreal Protocol
also reflect advances in scientific knowledge about methyl bromide.
COP activity can respond not only to changes in scientific knowl-
edge but also to learning about what is effective for dealing with
environmental problems, incorporating insights into implementation,
social resistance, and factors that influence effectiveness. Thus, the push
to acknowledge the benefits of sustainable utilization for some species'
survival in CITES reflects recognition of the effect of markets and of
people's behavior on the value society places on species, which in turn
can affect more indirect threats like habitat destruction. Similarly, the
emphasis on wise use in the Ramsar Convention incorporates the recog-
nition that people are part of the wetlands ecosystem and are, therefore,
relevant to protection strategies. At the same time, the CITES COPs have
developed monitoring devices in order to learn about the effects of trade
on certain species, allowing the COP to respond and adjust the protec-
tion status of a species if the need arises.8 °
The role of COPs is not limited to responding to scientific and social
learning. COPs can also enhance efficiency. Delegating the determina-
tion of procedures for. the Kyoto Protocol's flexible mechanisms for
forms of emissions trading and for various treaties' compliance and
monitoring systems is a more efficient use of the parties' time. It also
allows for some flexibility in those procedures so that they can adapt in
response to monitoring and information about their effectiveness for im-
plementation of the treaty.
At the same time, where core obligations of a treaty would be di-
rectly affected by COP activity, the parties can retain control by
determining that those changes should be subject to a consent-based,
rather than a consensus-based procedure-for example, changes to spe-
cies listed on the CITES appendices or a complete change in the form of
compliance mechanism that the treaty might apply to the parties.
Consensus-based COP activity also responds to shifts in scientific
understanding of environmental problems in another way. By defining
the terms of the treaty and authorizing guidance for implementation that
can be used by national implementing authorities, COPs allow for treaty
obligations to infiltrate national boundaries, so that they can be applied
more easily at the local level. This ability to move beyond the interna-
tional scale is consistent with the multiple, nested scales of management
180. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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required for sound environmental protection.' 8' If, as Jonathan Ver-
schuuren has found, the one thing that Ramsar site managers understand
about the Ramsar Convention is the obligation of wise use, this may be
due to the significant time and effort that the Ramsar COP's subsidiary
bodies have devoted to elaborating guidance in the implementation of
wise use.112
This multiple scale benefit to COP activity not only allows informa-
tion to move from the top down to lower levels of governance and
management, but can also allow information to move more readily from
the bottom upward. COP activity allows information to move both ways
by allowing for more participation by NGOs, scientists, and other private
parties, and, more importantly, by relying on these groups for informa-
tion that in turn feeds into the possibilities to respond to the information
described above. Consensus-based COP activity affects the level of par-
ticipation of non-governmental organizations8 3 (NGOs) and private
individuals, such as scientists and academics in international law-
making.'84 This is because resolutions and decisions generally provide
for more avenues for participation by NGOs and technical and scientific
individuals, particularly since resolutions are frequently based on the
work of technical bodies, with input from NGOs. Sometimes NGOs
work in close partnership with a treaty's institutions, tracking informa-
tion and providing data to the Secretariat and the parties. 85 Thus, when
181. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complex-
ity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 209 (2002); Wiersema, Train Without Tracks,
supra note 33, at 1251.
182. See Jonathan Verschuuren, The Case of Transboundary Wetlands Under the Ramsar
Convention: Keep the Lawyers Out!, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49, 119 (2008).
Verschuuren notes that actors generally have a sense only of the broad concept of wise use,
and not of its detailed elaboration. He argues, however, that increasing the legal status of the
work of convention bodies might contribute to the effectiveness of the treaty. Id. at 125-27;
see also Gardner & Connolly, Ramsar Convention, supra note 33.
183. The Ramsar Convention has five international organization partners, three of which
are NGOs. See Ramsar Memoranda of Understanding and Cooperation with Other Conven-
tions and International Organizations, http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/
main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=l-31-115 4000_0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). Some of these NGOs
provide assistance to the parties.
184. For example, the Ramsar Convention's Scientific and Technical Review Panel in-
cludes seventeen members: a representative for each of the geographical regions, a
representative for each of the Panel's priority work areas, and a representative for each of the
Convention's International Organization Partners. See The Scientific and Technical Review
Panel (STRP), http://www.ramsar.org/cda/ramsar/display/main/main.jsp?zn=ramsar&cp=l-
31-111_4000_- 0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
185. An NGO named "Traffic," for example, contributes information to the CITES Se-
cretariat about illegal traffic of species listed under the Convention. See http://www.traffic.org
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009). The Ramsar Convention's authorizing provision for its COP in-
cludes a requirement that "representatives of the Contracting Parties at such Conferences
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consensus-based COP activity shapes the obligations of the parties, those
obligations are being shaped by more than just the states parties present
at the COPs.
In these ways, consensus-based COP activity allows for a form of
adaptability and flexibility in law-making at the international level that
treaties do not allow.86 In doing so, it has the potential to make interna-
tional law more closely aligned and responsive to scientific and social
developments, in turn perhaps enhancing both implementation and effec-
tiveness. This adaptability also comes with other consequences, however,




As COPs become increasingly focused on thickening the original
obligations of their underlying treaty, modifying interpretations and
guidance, adapting commitments in response to the work of their scien-
tific and technical advisers, and developing the strategic framework for
the treaty as a whole, they may contribute to the formation of increas-
ingly self-referential regimes. This self-referential activity can in turn
lead to a particular type of fragmentation within the international legal
system.
Commentators have been expressing increasing concern about frag-
mentation in the international legal system. In 2006, concluding six
years of study, the International Law Commission (ILC) produced a 256-
page report, finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, that identified different
forms of fragmentation in the system and proposed a framework for ad-
dressing it that focused on legal reasoning rather than strict rules of
hierarchy.'88 The ILC was careful to stress that fragmentation was not an
should include persons who are experts on wetlands or waterfowl by reason of knowledge and
experience gained in scientific, administrative or other appropriate capacities." Ramsar Con-
vention, supra note 9, art. 7(1).
186. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
187. See generally Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions:
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
999 (2004).
188. See Study Group of the Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC, Fragmen-
tation].
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unmitigated evil; to reflect this, the Study Group had changed its name
from one that talked about risks to one that talked about difficulties. 9
The ILC's final report focused on difficulties related to the work of
tribunals faced with conflicts between different rules.' 90 This focus on
tribunals is consistent with the heavy emphasis on fragmentation in the
dispute resolution setting.' 9' However, the ILC's report went further than
some commentators, observing that these conflicts arise not only as a
result of an increasing number of tribunals but also as a result of differ-
ent kinds of fragmentation.' 9 The fragmentation most relevant to this
Article is not that resulting from a proliferation of specialized tribunals.
The fragmentation most relevant to this Article is fragmentation re-
sulting from a proliferation of increasingly specialized functional
regimes. This type of fragmentation, termed sectoral fragmentation by
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, reflects society's increasing functional
fragmentation into different issue-specific policy arenas.193
If we recognize that consensus-based COP activity contributes to
states parties' international legal obligations and not just their political
obligations, our picture of fragmentation in the international legal system
begins to look more like the sectorally fragmented system described by
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner. Consensus-based COP activity and the
thickening of the obligations of the parties as a result of that activity add
to the specialization of MEA regimes, and do so through consensus. This
specialization and the potential for COPs to develop increasingly thick
obligations means that regimes can become increasingly self-referential.
This can happen not only in the sense that environmental treaties may
increasingly disregard other systems, such as the trade system, but also
in the sense that they may disregard or misread the needs of other envi-
ronmental issue areas. '94 For example, the climate change regime under
189. Id. at 8; Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
845, 846-47 (2004); see also William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 963 (2004) (describing fragmentation as more of a transformation to a plu-
ralist legal system and noting some of the benefits of this shift in the dispute resolution
context); ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 14 (observing the positive reasons for spe-
cialization).
190. ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 16.
191. See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 189.
192. ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 10-11.
193. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 187, at 1008-09; see also Koskenniemi,
International Legislation Today, supra note 178, at 81-83.
194. Some commentators have expressed concern that a fragmented legal system could
result in some fields dominating others. See, e.g., Matthew Craven, Unity, Diversity and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 2003 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 5; Harro van Asselt et al.,
Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law, 30 LAW & POL'Y 423,
426 (2008); see also W. BRADNEE CHAMBERS, INTERLINKAGES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
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the Kyoto Protocol does not adequately take into account concerns about
biodiversity protection.' 95 Further, as COP activity facilitates the contri-
butions of scientists and NGOs to these treaty regimes, the community
of participants operating within a particular treaty or set of treaties may
also become increasingly self-referential. Recognizing the significance
of COP activity to the legal obligations of the parties facilitates our un-
derstanding of the richness of these regimes not only as political
regimes, but also as legal regimes. That in turn increases the likelihood
of a system developing with increasingly self-referential legal regimes.
2. Opportunities for Addressing Fragmentation in
Dispute Resolution Settings
Reframing the question about the nature of COP activity is not just
about providing a window into fragmentation. It also provides us with
ways to manage that fragmentation. This is because reframing the question
takes us away from questions about the hierarchy of legal norms and pro-
vides for a different approach to understanding parties' legal obligations. 96
This in turn has implications for how we manage fragmentation.' 97
The two tribunal decisions discussed in Part III suggest different
ways to treat COP activity. This affects how we might deal with frag-
mentation, at least within the dispute resolution context. The avenue for
this approach lies in the techniques available for treaty interpretation
under the VCLT, which appear to have played a small role in the two
tribunal decisions.
In its provisions on interpretation, generally regarded as reflecting
customary international law, Article 31 of the VCLT states that in inter-
preting a treaty:
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (2008) (discussing increasing recognition of
the lack of coordination among MEAs and ways to improve the effectiveness of MEAs by
creating better interlinkages).
195. See Imke Sagemuller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for Biodiversity?, 31
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 207 (2006); Van Asselt et al., supra note 194, at 428-29.
196. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 187, at 1003 (arguing that hierarchical
schemes to address fragmentation have a "minimal chance of success" and also misunderstand
the cause of norm collision).
197. See id. at 434-35; Van Asselt et al., supra note 194, at 430-31 (observing that if
COP decisions were regarded as lawmaking within the scope of the VCLT, "the scope for
application of international law on conflicts would substantially expand").
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(3) There shall be taken into account, as well as context,
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provi-
sions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.'98
These interpretive principles are not intended to be used only in
cases of ambiguity. In its commentaries on the ILC's draft Article 27,
which became Article 31, the ILC made it clear that the provisions in
Article 31(3) were to be read together with the provisions in Article
3 1 (1) and 31(2), and that Article 31(3) was not hierarchically inferior to
the context of the treaty.' 99 The order, the ILC stated, followed logic,
rather than any hierarchy:
[I]t is only logic which suggests that the elements in paragraph
3-a subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation, subse-
quent practice establishing the understanding of the parties
regarding the interpretation and relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties-should fol-
low and not precede the elements in the previous paragraphs.
The logical consideration which suggests this is that these ele-
ments are extrinsic to the text. But these three elements are all of
an obligatory character and by their nature could not be consid-
ered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those
which precede them.2 0
"Subsequent agreement" under Article 31 (3)(a) does not refer to a treaty
as such, but only to an agreement. As the ILC's commentary states, "an
agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the con-
clusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties
which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation. 20 '
198. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 3 1(3).
199. Cf LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 428-29 (1961) (regarding the possibility
of reference to subsequent agreement and practice as something applicable only in cases of
ambiguity).
200. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 1966 YB. INT'L LAW
COMM'N, 187, 220 [hereinafter ILC, Draft Articles].
201. Id. at 22 1.
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As for subsequent practice under Article 31 (3)(b), it "constitutes ob-
jective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of
the treaty." '2° Its value "varies according as it shows the common under-
standing of the parties as to the meaning of the terms '" 203 Although
earlier texts of this provision had included a reference to practice that
"establishes the understanding of all the parties," this phrase was omitted
in the final text.2°4 The Commission "considered that the phrase 'the un-
derstanding of the parties' necessarily mean[t] 'the parties as a
whole.' ,205 Thus, the word "all" was omitted merely "to avoid any possi-
ble misconception that every party must individually have engaged in the
practice where it suffices that it should have accepted the practice.
' 2°6
Commentators have periodically suggested that the provisions of the
VCLT on subsequent agreements might be used to allow for COP resolu-
tions and decisions to be relevant to a dispute resolution body
interpreting a treaty. 07 This would not automatically change the status of
all consensus-based COP activity from soft law to hard law. Yet, unless a
tribunal is willing to see COP activity as something more than soft law
or more than an interpretive device, it will be hard for that tribunal to use
COP activity to override an existing treaty obligation.2 0 ' The Dutch
Crown's approach and the new question posed in this Article suggests,
however, that there is a way for a tribunal to consider COP activity with-
out having to take the step of determining that COP activity is actually
hard law fitting within traditional categories of international law.
This is because the VCLT's interpretive provisions, when placed
alongside the question of what the relationship of COP activity is to the
original parties' obligations, allows for a more careful exploration of the
current legal obligations of those parties. As such, COP activity may be
relevant to a tribunal's decisionmaking even without a declaration that it
is hard international law.
This alone does not, however, implicate fragmentation. For that we
need to stretch a little beyond current practice. In the dispute resolution
context, seeing consensus-based COP activity as legally relevant opens
up the possibility that a tribunal can understand the activity of the parties
at COPs as contributing to the overall legal obligations of those parties.
202. Id.




207. See, e.g., Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 1, at 641.
208. Klabbers, supra note 133, at 172-77 (arguing that when soft law is applied it be-
comes "indistinguishable" from hard law).
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This might in turn allow tribunals to look beyond their own treaty's ac-
tivities where the same issue is addressed in multiple fora.
This would be a far-reaching application of the subsequent agree-
ment and practice provisions of the VCLT. Even if the VCLT allows for
recognition of subsequent agreements in the manner I have proposed,
this does not automatically mean that regimes should be able to look
beyond the confines of their own regime for subsequent agreements in
other regimes.2 9 However, allowing for the possibility of this interpreta-
tion at least as it pertains to common terms used by multiple treaties has
the potential to open up avenues for integration to limit systemic frag-
mentation. Even if a tribunal is not permitted to look beyond its own
regime in the case of a conflict, it might be willing to do so in the face of
a gap. In those cases, the recognition of the significance of COP activity
would provide a more accurate reflection of the state of the parties' obli-
gations.
Further, the potential to push the VCLT to help limit systemic frag-
mentation becomes more compelling when we look to Article 31(3)(c) of
the VCLT, which allows for "any relevant rules of international law ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties" to be taken into account
when interpreting a treaty.2 ° Barely commented on at the time of the
ILC's commentaries to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, this
provision was the subject of its own study when the ILC addressed
fragmentation .2 ,
Arguably, Article 31(3)(c) allows for a tribunal to look beyond its
own regime to apply general international law.22 If we accept the ILC's
view that no regime is entirely self-contained in the sense that no regime
is completely independent of international law beyond its own regime,
this clause could have important implications.2 Where COP activity is
seen as contributing to the legal obligations of the parties and shaping
them, it is, in turn, more likely that this activity can be seen as part of the
body of general international law.14 This is, of course, not true of very
technical or specific COP resolutions or decisions, such as allowances
for methyl bromide under the Montreal Protocol, but could be true of
209. See ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 212-13.
210. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(c).
211. See ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 10, 206-44.
212. Id. at 212-13 (noting that tribunals can go beyond the four comers of their constitu-
tive instrument when resolving disputes).
213. Id. at 91-97; see also Anja Lindroos & Michael Mehling, Dispelling the Chimera of
'Self-Contained Regimes': International Law and the WTO, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 857 (2005).
214. See ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 214 (observing that Article 31(3)(c) of
the VCLT refers to "rules" of general international law).
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interpretations and similar developments under a treaty.25 Further, it
might be true where treaty bodies elaborate on common terms or princi-
ples.216
In some instances, tribunals will look beyond their own regime for
assistance in interpreting a particular provision or determining its legal
status. The WTO, for example, has canvassed a range of different bodies
and instruments to help it consider the status of the precautionary princi-
ple in international law, before concluding that the principle would not
override the provisions of the agreement at issue in the dispute before
it.217 Although the WTO Appellate Body and Panel did not explicitly de-
cide on the status of the precautionary principle in international law, 2,8 it
is arguable that if the principle had a higher legal status, it would have
had more relevance for the WTO's dispute resolution bodies, particularly
in their application of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Recognizing COP
activity as significant for understanding international legal obligation
could have allowed the WTO's dispute resolution bodies to recognize
that the precautionary principle formed the subject of ongoing COP ac-
tivity, which in turn affected the parties' obligations under those treaties.
215. Questions remain about the exact scope of Article 31(3)(c). See ILC, Fragmenta-
tion, supra note 188, at 232-43. Temporal questions could be particularly significant for the
application of Article 31(3)(c) to consensus-based COP activity. See id. at 240-43; see also
Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 573, 611-13
(2005); Chris Wold, Ninth Intergovernmental Meeting on the Action Plan for the Caribbean
Environment Programme and Sixth Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
Kingston, Jam., Feb. 14-18, 2000, Legal Assessment of Compatibility Issues Between the
Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW) to the Cartagena Con-
vention and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES), at 11-12, U.N. Doc. UNEP (DEC)/ CAR IG 17/INF.5, available at http://
www.cep.unep.org/events-and-meetings/i-spaw-cop/igl7-inf5en.pdf (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
216. See Harro van Asselt, Dealing with the Fragmentation of Global Climate Govern-
ance: Legal and Political Approaches in Interplay Management 9 (Global Governance
Working Paper No. 30, 2007), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doclWP30.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009).
217. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Mar-
keting of Biotech Products, at 336-41, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29,
2006) (adopted Nov. 21, 2006) [hereinafter WTO Panel, EC-Biotech]; Appellate Body Report,
European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), at 46-
49, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter
WTO Appellate Body, EC-Hormones]; see also ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 223-
28. On the role of international law in WTO decisionmaking, see generally Joost Pauwelyn,
The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
535 (2001). See also Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Resolution Proceed-
ings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 499 (2001); Lindroos & Mehling, supra note 213.
218. WTO Appellate Body, EC-Hormones, supra note 217, at 47-48; WTO Panel, EC-
Biotech, supra note 217, at 340-41.
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This would, in turn, have changed the inquiry by the WTO and the status
of the principle under international law. Instead of asking about the sta-
tus of the precautionary principle and its definition as law or non-law,
the WTO could have engaged in a more searching inquiry into the way
in which original obligations have been shaped by subsequent agreement
or practice-referring to VCLT Article 3 1(3)(a) or (b)-or into the "rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties"-
referring to VCLT Article 31(3)(c).2"9
Recognizing the significance of consensus-based COP activity for
the parties' underlying treaty obligations elevates its status as part of in-
ternational law and allows it to become visible to a tribunal, in part by
removing questions of hierarchy that would otherwise tie the tribunal's
hands.
3. Opportunities for Addressing Fragmentation Beyond the
Dispute Resolution Setting
This change in how we view COP activity also has the potential to
affect levels of sectoral fragmentation outside of the dispute resolution
setting. Since much of international law, and particularly international
environmental law, will never see the inside of a dispute resolution tribu-
nal, these are potentially the more wide-ranging opportunities.2 0 Further,
as both the ILC's final report and Fischer-Lescano and Teubner note,
techniques for addressing conflicting rules before dispute resolution tri-
bunals cannot resolve underlying norm conflicts.221
A tribunal is bound to apply a certain set of laws.222 Thus, although
in some instances, the VCLT's interpretive provisions might allow for a
review of other regimes' activity, as suggested in the example of the
WTO, this will not always be true.223 In addition, tribunals in different
219. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3).
220. "Contrary to the perception which seems to be developing in some quarters, the
principle [of systemic integration in Article 31(3)(c)] is certainly not a universal panacea [for
fragmentation] .... No principle which relies on techniques of interpretation alone can do
that." Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the
Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279, 318 (2005); see also JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 272-73 (2003); Borgen, supra note
215, at 619 (noting that recent incidents of treaty conflicts were resolved, if at all, through
negotiations rather than in courtrooms).
221. Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 187, at 1021-22, 1030; ILC, Fragmenta-
tion, supra note 188, at 17.
222. Cf ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 212-13 (arguing that tribunals can go
beyond the four comers of their constitutive instrument when resolving disputes).
223. See McLachlan, supra note 220, at 304 (observing that although the WTO Appel-
late Body has made "extensive reference to other rules of international law in carrying out its
interpretive function[s]," in at least two decisions the Appellate Body ultimately found that
Fall 2009]
Michigan Journal of International Law
regimes are more likely to feel bound by hierarchies related to jurisdic-
tion and competence, even if the hierarchical status of COP activity is
changed. 2'
By contrast, when parties act within a particular treaty, they are only
constrained by that treaty's obligations and the obligations they are sub-
ject to under other regimes and general international law.25
If our discourse of international legal obligation is able to take ac-
count of consensus-based COP activity as significant for a party's legal
obligations, this could result in parties paying increasing attention to the
thick obligations they and their counterparts incurred in other treaties.
This in turn could result in linkages across treaties, as states parties learn
from the activities of other conventions and find ways to borrow from
them and grow mutually.226 This development could limit the self-
referential quality of otherwise increasingly specialized regimes, while
still allowing for the specialization that can be fruitful for particular re-
gimes.27 Thus, it is not only a tribunal that can be cognizant of another
treaty's interpretation of a term like the precautionary principle, but it is
also the representatives of states parties. 28
This opportunity benefits from the flexibility and adaptive possibili-
ties of COP activity, which are not bound by the same strictures as
amendments to treaty texts or completely new treaties. Beyond the dis-
"the express obligations assumed by the parties under the Covered Agreements of the WTO
overrode the principles of international environmental law whose application was sought").
McLachlan was a participant in the ILC Study on Fragmentation of International Law and
worked specifically on questions relating to Article 31(3)(c). See id. at 279; see also ILC,
Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 224.
224. McLachlan, supra note 220, at 318 ("The principle of systemic integration must
take its place alongside a wider set of techniques which resolve such conflicts by choosing
between two rival norms'").
225. See ILC, Fragmentation, supra note 188, at 208.
226. See Van Asselt et al., supra note 194, at 436 (discussing ways in which the WTO
panel could use material from the Kyoto Protocol); id. at 431-32 (recognizing the legal sig-
nificance of COP decisions as an important step to evaluating different proposals for
interlinkages). There is a growing literature addressing linkages across treaties in response to
the volume of treaties, with some addressing political linkages and others addressing legal
linkages. See, e.g., Cinnamon Pifion Carlarne, Good Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented
System of International Law Away?, 30 LAW & POL'Y 450, 469 (2008); CHAMBERS, supra note
194; Sebastian Oberthtir & Thomas Gehring, Conceptual Foundations of Institutional Interac-
tion, in INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: SYNERGY
AND CONFLICT AMONG INTERNATIONAL AND EU POLICIES 19 (Thomas Gehring & Sebastian
Oberthur eds., 2006) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION]; Van Asselt, supra note 216.
227. Although Fischer-Lescano and Teubner do not hold out much hope for combating
legal fragmentation, they do argue that a "weak normative compatibility of the fragments
might be achieved," provided that conflicts law can work to "effect a loose coupling of collid-
ing units." Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 187, at 1004; see also id. at 1017-19,
1045-46.
228. CHAMBERS, supra note 194, at 247; Van Asselt et al., supra note 194, at 432.
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pute resolution setting, parties have a tremendous opportunity to become
aware of possibilities for cooperation and collaboration, borrowing and
learning across different sectoral regimes.229 This could create opportuni-
ties for productive learning and development, with a continued
thickening of their obligations, based on enhanced knowledge and a less
self-referential approach within a particular regime.
The recognition of a kind of legal status enhances these opportuni-
ties because it allows for a level of visibility of COP activity that would
otherwise be missing, as well as a reflection on the relationship of the
COP activity to the parties' underlying treaty obligations.
C. Risks for Accountability
The adaptability that consensus-based COP activity allows and the
opportunities for managing fragmentation lead, however, to some risks
with respect to accountability.230 There is no guarantee that COPs will
use their power responsibly, working to manage fragmentation in pro-
ductive ways.
231Consensus-based COP activities diminish the role of state consent .
The opportunities that COP activity provides for adaptability and for
managing fragmentation do not change this fact.232 Increasing delegation
can lead to serious concerns about displacement of the state's role in de-
termining the content of international law.2 33 This is exacerbated when
we recognize that this activity is consensus-based, without provision for
express consent by a state to be bound by it and without the possibility
of opting out.
229. See Thomas Gehring & Sebastian Oberthur, Comparative Empirical Analysis and
Ideal Types of Institutional Interaction, in INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION, supra note 226, at
307, 327-31 (discussing cognitive interaction as a means of institutional interaction); Van
Asselt, supra note 216, at 8 (noting that questions of interaction among treaties are more likely
to be dealt with through COP decisions than by amendment to those treaties).
230. See Andreas L. Paulus, Commentary to Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teub-
ner: The Legitimacy of International Law and the Role of the State, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1047, 1048-49, 1054 (2004) (discussing the "democratic deficit" of regional and international
institutions and concerns about the legitimacy of law-making by functionally differentiated
legal regimes).
231. See generally Brunnde, Reweaving the Fabric, supra note 1; Brunn6e, COPing with
Consent, supra note 1.
232. Paulus, supra note 230, at 1054 (arguing that the criteria to determine whether deci-
sions are legitimate should not be based on the functional quality of the decision, but should
be general).
233. This has been a particular concern in the literature on international organizations.
See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers,
31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 591 (2008).
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Even if we temporarily shelve concerns about the diminishment of
the role of consent as a requirement for international legal obligation,
this loss of control by the state has several potential consequences. First,
it is possible that the very same forces that work towards integration can
also lead to a takeover by a particular sectoral regime. Only if all sys-
tems are working in the same integrative manner can we be sure that
environmental matters will not be taken over by trade concerns, or vice
versa.
Second, and relatedly, COP activity may shift the parties' obligations
away from what was originally intended by the parties to the treaty. In
some cases, this can be a beneficial development, where, for example,
the treaty is now responding to increasing scientific knowledge. It could
be said that shifts to a more ecologically sound approach in the Ramsar
Convention as a result of COP activity are a valuable response to new
scientific information.
In other cases, however, COP activity may-incrementally or
overtly-shift the direction of the treaty away from its original goal be-
cause other forces are crowding the mission of the original treaty."'
Development concerns may, for example, gradually shift the focus of
some environmental treaties away from their original protective position.
However, we should not believe that more state control would, by it-
self, avoid these possibilities. After all, the voting members of the COPs
are the representatives to the treaty's states parties. We are not, therefore,
talking about a shift of control entirely away from states and to private
actors, dispute resolution bodies, or NGOs. To the extent that a majority
of states parties can agree on shifts in the direction of the treaty, this can
be taken as at least partial acceptance of those shifts.
Further, the activity of COPs is at least as visible as treaty texts, at
least in the environmental setting. MEAs have highly accessible websites
and the results of COP activity are easily available-including reports of
meetings, supporting documentation for particular resolutions and deci-
sions,"' and reports of meetings by subsidiary bodies. In addition, the
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), a non-profit newsletter, has now be-
come a mainstay of MEA COPs and meetings of subsidiary bodies,
providing daily updates of the activity of the parties and the discussions
234. Wiersema, Train Without Tracks, supra note 33, at 1291-94.
235. See, e.g., Basel Convention, http://www.basel.int (last visited Oct. 25, 2009);
CITES, http://www.cites.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/2860.php
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009); Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/2830.php
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (including the Kyoto Protocol's framework agreement); Montreal
Protocol, http://ozone.unep.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); Ramsar Convention, http://
www.ramsar.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
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surrounding this activity.236 These are all available on the internet and
relevant MEAs frequently also provide direct links to Bulletins covering
their meetings. 237 Thus, to the extent that information is one means of
managing accountability concerns, this accessibility should help.238
Finally, the question posed in this Article-that is, what relationship
COP activity has with the parties' original treaty obligations-provides
some check on just how far parties will be able to change the terms of
the treaty through consensus-based activity. As we saw in Part I, the Ba-
sel Convention's decision to ban the export of waste from OECD
countries to non-OECD countries went beyond the terms of the original
treaty. It also raised serious disputes about the legality of the provision.
Where COP activity goes too far beyond the scope of the original treaty,
the shock to the original obligations is too severe. At this point, the COP
activity does not thicken the original obligations of the parties, but mate-
rially alters them. At that point, it can no longer be said that the COP
activity is inextricably bound up with the provisions of the treaty. Rather,
it appears more akin to a stand-alone norm whose legal status can be
evaluated according to the traditional criteria for finding international
law. Thus asking the question about the legality of COP activity by fo-
cusing on its relationship to the underlying treaty obligations ensures
that there are some limits on the drift that can occur, even if some drift is
likely.
One final concern must be addressed. International lawyers may be
concerned that this Article proposes that we take consensus-based COP
activity seriously simply because doing so better reflects the reality of
how a treaty operates rather than because parties actually intend to create
new legally normative obligations. As discussed in Part II, this could be
seen as an apologist position that negates the value of international
law.239
However, the combination of the axes discussed in Part II and the
way this Article poses the question about the role of consensus-based
236. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, http://www.iisd.ca/enbvol/enb-background.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2009) (discussing the origins and role of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin).
See generally International Institute for Sustainable Development - Reporting Services (IISD
RS), http://www.iisd.ca (last visited Nov. 11, 2009) (providing links to bulletins and other
reporting services).
237. See, e.g., CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/index.shtml (providing links to
Earth Negotiations Bulletin coverage of its COPs) (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
238. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction of Science
and Technology with International Law, 88 Ky. L.J. 809, 852 (2000) (observing that states can
easily keep abreast of negotiations due to modern communications technology).
239. See Abbot et al., Legalization, supra note 116, at 412; Raustiala, supra note 116, at
589; Ulfstein, Comment, supra note 16, at 149.
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COP activity allows intent to be one factor in the equation for determin-
ing the significance of a particular COP resolution or decision. Not all
COP activity will have the same significance and not all COP activity
should be treated the same, but intent can be one factor in the determina-
tion.
Indeed, parties spend a great deal of energy negotiating the resolu-
tions and decisions of COPs, using them to make statements about their
own priorities and the obligations they have committed to under the un-
derlying treaty. As parties negotiate, sometimes in hard-fought ways,
about the terms of a COP resolution that interprets or supplements a trea-
ty, can it really be said that they do not intend it to have any impact on
international legal obligation? If that were true, then COP activity would
be less than soft law. It would exist in an increasingly narrow, special-
ized world of political activity without legal effect.
To suggest that this activity is not intended to have any effect on
these states' treaty obligations belies the real story of what this COP ac-
tivity is intended to do. It is almost certainly not intended to stand alone
as new law. However, it is almost certainly intended to affect how the
parties are to understand their international legal obligations under a
treaty. This is a particular form of intent that both negates COP activity's
status as hard international law under traditional categories and elevates
its status beyond simply soft law or non-law.
It is true, however, that most consensus-based COP activity is almost
certainly only intended to have legal effect within the treaty regime. This
may limit the opportunities for dealing with fragmentation through treaty
interpretation, to be sure. But to the extent that parties are willing to
reach out beyond their own treaty regime to the work of COPs of other
MEAs, especially beyond the dispute resolution context, even treaty-
specific legal effects could have broader implications for managing the
risks of an increasingly sectorally fragmented international legal system.
CONCLUSION
Conferences of the Parties to multilateral environmental agreements
add to the thickness of states parties' international legal obligations
through resolutions and decisions that interpret, offer guidance, and
monitor effectiveness and compliance. In many cases, COP activity has
substantially enhanced the substance of the core obligations of parties to
an underlying treaty. And this activity is done by consensus of the par-
ties, without provision for opt-out.
COP activity does not create new stand-alone law. Nor, however,
does it lack any implication for existing hard law.
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Using conventional approaches for determining the sources of inter-
national law, this COP activity would rarely be classified as hard
international law. Indeed, conventional approaches fail to capture the
particular role that consensus-based COP activity plays in international
legal obligation because they fail to capture this activity's tight relation-
ship with the underlying treaty obligations of the parties.
Perhaps as a result, this COP activity is almost invariably treated as
soft law by commentators, with little more analysis. However, placing
the activity of COPs into this category of normative obligation between
hard law and non-law creates a hierarchical tripartite structure of hard
law, soft law, and non-law that does not accurately reflect the relation-
ship of consensus-based COP activity to the states parties' underlying
legal obligations.
To reflect this relationship, the question is not whether COP activity
is international law. The question we should begin asking, rather, is what
the relationship of COP activity is to the parties' underlying treaty obli-
gations. Refraining the question in this way provides us with a way to
explore more accurately the role of COP activity for international legal
obligation.
Refraining the question also has implications for how we understand
fragmentation in the international legal system. We begin to see a picture
of increasingly specialized regimes, adding to sectoral fragmentation.
This in turn raises concerns about increasingly self-referential regimes
becoming unresponsive to the work of other regimes both within their
own field of environmental law, and outside it.
However, refraining the question also suggests potential ways to
manage that fragmentation, both through treaty interpretation rules for
dispute resolution bodies and beyond the dispute resolution context in
the ongoing activity of the parties to international treaties. This man-
agement is not without risks-particularly for accountability-but when
paired against the risks of fragmentation, it is the better approach.
Consensus-based COP activity is a significant source of international
legal obligation. When evaluated according to axes that draw on consent,
authority, intent, and effect, and when judged by its relationship to states
parties' obligations under the original treaty, the legal significance of
COP activity becomes clearer. This in turn gives us a more accurate pic-
ture of the international legal system and international legal obligation
today.
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